NSW PUBLIC HEALTH BULLETIN

Year in Review 2008

Year in review: communicable disease surveillance, NSW, 2008

Communicable Diseases Branch, NSW Department of Health

In this issue, we present our annual review of notifiable diseases reported in New South Wales (NSW) residents. For greater depth of detail, refer to Tables 2–6, which show disease-specific data reported by: year of onset; month of onset; area health service (AHS); and age group and sex.

Trends

Among the 53 573 notifications of medical conditions by doctors, hospital staff and laboratory staff in NSW residents in 2008, highlights included:

Conditions most frequently reported

- Chlamydia: 14043 cases (201 per 100000 population), with the highest crude rates by geographical area in the Greater Western (Broken Hill region), South Eastern Sydney Illawarra (Randwick region), Sydney South West (Camperdown region) and Hunter New England (Tamworth region) AHSs.
- Pertussis: 8756 cases (126 per 100000 population), with the highest crude rates in the North Coast (Lismore region), Sydney West (Penrith and Parramatta regions), South Eastern Sydney Illawarra (Wollongong region) and Greater Western (Dubbo region) AHSs.
- Hepatitis C: 3916 cases (56 per 100 000 population), with the highest crude rates in the Greater Western (Broken Hill and Dubbo regions), North Coast (Lismore region) and Sydney South West (Camperdown region) AHSs.
- Hepatitis B: 2638 cases (38 per 100 000 population) with the highest crude rates in the Sydney South West (Camperdown and Liverpool regions) and Sydney West (Parramatta region) AHSs.
- *Salmonella* infection: 2263 cases (32 per 100000 population) with the highest crude rates in the

North Coast (Lismore region) and Northern Sydney Central Coast (Gosford and Hornsby regions) AHSs.

Conditions with the most meaningful declines in the number of notifications compared with previous years

- Hepatitis A: cases have more than halved in number since 2002 (69 cases in 2008 compared with 149 in 2002 and 421 in 1999). This may be due in part to the introduction of a commercial vaccine in the 1990s. Travel to countries where Hepatitis A is endemic was the most commonly reported risk factor for disease acquisition in 2008.
- Hepatitis C: cases have decreased by over 50% in number in the last 10 years (3916 cases in 2008 compared with 8598 cases in 1999). The cause of this decline is unclear. It may reflect a real decrease in transmission related to prevention programs, or it may reflect a decrease in hepatitis C testing.
- Meningococcal serogroup C disease: notifications continue to decline (nine cases reported for 2008), largely due to the introduction of meningococcal C vaccination in late 2003.
- Meningococcal serogroup B disease: notifications have decreased steadily over the past few years. In 2008, there were 49 cases reported, compared with 103 in 2002. The reason for this decrease is unclear.
- Rubella: notifications have decreased from 191 cases in 2000 to 17 cases in 2008. This may be due to higher rates of immunisation over the past decade.

Conditions with the most meaningful increases in the number of notifications compared with previous years

• Pertussis has shown the greatest increase in the number of infections, up from 2100 in 2007 to 8756 in 2008;

Table 1.The five most commonly reported notifiablediseases by age group, NSW, 2008

alseases by age group, its in, 2000	
Age group	Rate/100 000
Children under 5 years	
1. Pertussis	264
2. Salmonella infection	120
3. Giardiasis	100
4. Influenza	55
5. Cryptosporidiosis	38
Children and young adults (5–24 years)	
1. Chlamydia ^{*#}	437
2. Pertussis	187
3. Salmonella infection	34
4. Hepatitis C	24
5. Hepatitis B	22
Adults (25–44 years)	
1. Chlamydia*	265
2. Hepatitis C	105
3. Pertussis	92
4. Hepatitis B	72
5. Gonorrhoea	39
Adults (45–64 years)	
1. Pertussis	91
2. Hepatitis C	71
3. Hepatitis B	38
4. Chlamydia*	37
5. Influenza	23
Older adults (≥65 years)	
1. Pertussis	70
2. Influenza	36
3. Salmonella infection	25
4. Arboviral infection	22
5. Pneumococcal disease	21
Totals	
1. Chlamydia*	201
2. Pertussis	126
3. Hepatitis C	56
4. Hepatitis B	38
5. Salmonella infection	32

*refers to Chlamydia trachomatis infections.

[#]where a case is reported in a child under 16 years of age, the relevant public health unit contacts the treating doctor outlining his/her obligation to notify the Department of Community Services. Source: NSW Notifiable Diseases Database.

this reflects a large, statewide outbreak that continues in 2009, as well as improved diagnostic technology.

- Chlamydia has been reported at the highest rate since it became a notifiable disease in 1998 (14043 cases in 2008), reflecting a long-standing trend of increases in notifications of this disease.
- The number of Ross River virus notifications increased from 844 in 2007 to 1155 in 2008. This is consistent

with past cyclical fluctuations in Ross River virus activity.

- The number of *Salmonella* infections showed a small decline compared with the previous year (2263 in 2008 compared with 2555 in 2007), but numbers remain high compared with the 10-year average.
- The number of verotoxigenic *Escherichia coli* infections remained higher than usual, with 17 cases reported in 2008, compared with an average of four cases per year for the 10-year period prior to 2007. All cases were investigated and no epidemiological links were identified.
- The number of cases of infectious syphilis remained at comparatively high levels in 2008, reflecting an outbreak among men who have sex with men residing in inner-Sydney.

Conditions least frequently reported

There were no reported cases of anthrax, avian influenza, botulism, chancroid, diphtheria, lyssavirus, plague, polio, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), smallpox, typhus, viral haemorrhagic fever or yellow fever in NSW in 2008. One case of tetanus was reported.

Top five notifiable diseases

Rates for the most commonly reported notifiable diseases for each age group and geographical area of residence at the time of notification are presented in Figure 1 and Table 1. These lists indicate the relative importance of notifiable diseases only and should not be used to indicate the spread of all infectious diseases in NSW. It should also be noted that these rates are heavily influenced by testing practices and, in many instances, do not necessarily indicate the true or relative incidence in the community. Finally, these lists do not include institutional gastrointestinal outbreaks because comprehensive demographic data are not collected for such outbreaks.

Geographical distribution of notifiable diseases

- *Chlamydia trachomatis* infection was the most commonly reported infection across NSW, with the highest rates observed in rural areas, followed by regional and metropolitan areas.
- The rate of pertussis infections was highest in rural areas, particularly in northern NSW, followed by metropolitan and regional areas.
- Rates of hepatitis C infection were comparable across rural, regional and metropolitan areas. Most of these cases represent chronic infection rather than acute hepatitis C acquisition and as such may not accurately reflect the recent spread of hepatitis C in the community.
- Arboviral infections were more commonly reported in people residing in rural and regional areas than in metropolitan areas.
- Tuberculosis was most frequently reported in metropolitan areas, and was rare in rural regions.

Table 2. Disease notifications by year of onset of illness^a, NSW, 1991–2008

Condition	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Adverse event after immunisation	9	31	23	40	28	56	70	95	16	42	111	178	219	187	107	71	234	248
Anthrax Anthraying infection	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Arboviral infection Barmah Forest virus ^b	408 6	343 6	656 25	381 39	539 271	1227 172	1806 185	783 134	1220 249	980 197	1191 401	665 396	1023 451	1152 405	1090 450	1917 644	1500 573	1851 533
Ross River virus ^b	297	324	599	331	236	1031	1598	583	952	750	717	183	493	703	584	1221	844	1155
Other ^b	105	13	32	11	32	24	23	66	19	33	73	86	79	44	56	52	83	163
Blood lead level $\ge 15 \mu g/dL^b$				Decemb			710	874	691	984	513	516	338	303	234	298	292	260
Botulism Brucellosis ^b	0	0 2	0 4	0 4	0 2	0	0 3	0 3	1 2	0 1	0 1	0 2	0 3	1 7	0 3	0 10	0 4	0 2
Chancroid ^b		_) ecembe			5	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chlamydia trachomatis infection									2469	3511	4500	5823	7788	10035	11288	12059	12461	14043
Congenital chlamydia ^b				ugust 1					14	18	16	15	23	28	46	39	31	39
Chlamydia – other ^b Cholera ^b	Not no	otifiable 0	e until A 1	ugust 1 0	998 1	3	1	1	2455 2	3493 0	4484 1	5808 1	7765 0	10007 1	11242 0	12020 3	12430 2	14004 2
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease ^b				o April 200		2	'	1	2	0	1	1	0	6	8	10	2	6
Cryptosporidiosis ^b				Decembe			157	1130	121	134	195	306	203	357	849	779	545	484
Foodborne illness (NOS) ^e	2765	253	106	213	270	211	255	201	151	147	56	41	1071	550	309	507	763	667
Gastroenteritis (institutional) Giardiasis ^b	158	406	443	296 August 1	1359	554	939	738	673 1091	697 979	775 967	1752 863	3583 1028	12784 1235	1395 1449	10641	10488 1946	10135 1783
Gonorrhoea ^b	392	491	382 3	357 3	428	522	636	1054	1291	1060	1364	1526	1329	1235	1449	1725 1738	1383	1332
Haemolytic uraemic syndrome				Decembe		522	3	6	11	9	2	7	5	9	11	11	13	17
Haemophilus influenzae serotype b	212	217	124	61	29	13	17	11	13	8	7	10	6	5	7	11	7	9
Hib epiglottitis ^b	15	57	32	21	6	2	5	1	2	2	1	1	0	3	0	1	1	1
Hib meningitis ^b Hib conticeomie ^b	48 11	103 26	53 24	17 12	11 8	4	3 1	3 4	3 6	1 4	1 2	1 3	0	0 2	2 4	0 6	2 2	2 3
Hib septicaemia ^b Hib infection NOS ^b	138	26 31	24 15	12	8 4	3 4	8	4	6 2	4	2	3 5	1 5	2	4	6 4	2	3
Hepatitis A ^b	1119	901	579	585	614	958	1426	927	421	201	197	149	124	137	83	95	65	69
Hepatitis B	1492	3169	3603	3983	4007	3504	3167	2957	3508	3972	4555	3546	2845	2811	2744	2513	2637	2638
Hepatitis B – acute viral ^b	409	112	95	74	61	43	53	58	77	100	94	88	74	53	56	53	56	46
Hepatitis B – other ^b	1083 850	3057 3895	3508 5896	3909 7818	3946 6878	3461 6999	3114 6926	2899 7206	3431 8598	3872 8295	4461 8650	3458 6692	2771 5246	2758 4916	2688 4365	2460 4397	2581 4210	2592 3916
Hepatitis C Hepatitis C – acute viral ^b	22	26	22	16	32	18	6926 19	112	111	222	295	152	127	4916	4305	4397	4210	24
Hepatitis C – other ^b	828	3869	5874	7802	6846	6981	6907	7094	8487	8073	8355	6540	5119	4857	4322	4342	4145	3892
Hepatitis D ^b	0	8	12	19	19	9	11	3	14	12	11	9	12	14	15	15	11	14
Hepatitis E ^b	0	0	1	2	0	3	6	4	7	9	6	6	6	8	7	10	8	14
HIV infection ^b Influenza	824	693	589	503	536	449	423	404	377	350	341 244	394 1012	412 861	403 1011	391 1414	367 617	390 1918	322 1813
Influenza – Type A ^b	Not n	otifiable	e until [Decembe	er 2000						244	770	767	797	1055	421	1488	744
Influenza – Type B ^b				Decemb							27	241	55	161	280	150	180	971
Influenza – Type A & B ^b				ecembe										26	65	37	43	81
Influenza – Type NOS ^b				Decemb		- 4					1	1	39	27	14	9	207	17
Legionellosis L. longbeachae ^b	37 0	104 14	66 13	60 8	75 16	74 30	33 9	46 19	41 12	41 12	68 29	44 21	60 37	80 27	89 24	78 22	105 29	89 51
L. pneumophila ^b	16	80	34	30	35	34	18	22	22	26	38	21	23	51	24 64	55	74	37
Legionnaires' disease – other	21	10	19	22	24	10	6	5	7	3	1	1	0	2	1	1	2	1
Leprosy	1	7	5	3	3	2	0	0	1	2	4	0	2	5	1	1	4	4
Leptospirosis ^b Listeriosis ^b	28	21	16	14	6	33 22	33 23	50	56 22	54	66	39	39 28	40 30	35 25	17	9	17
Listeriosis ^o Lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV) ^b	11	13 0	12 0	10 0	14 0	0	25	28 0	22	18 0	12 0	11 0	28	30 1	25	26 1	22 0	34 1
Malaria ^b	171	110	174	184	96	204	173	158	174	233	157	105	121	101	206	140	98	116
Measles	495	805	2348	1484	596	191	273	119	32	36	31	8	18	12	5	60	4	39
Measles – laboratory confirmed	19	76	460	302	138	35	98	19	13	22	18	6	14	11	4	48	4	34
Measles – other Meningococcal disease	476 128	729 121	1888 153	1182 142	458 113	156 161	175 218	100 186	19 221	14 253	13 234	2 216	4 202	1 149	1 140	12 107	0 112	5 81
Meningococcal disease Meningococcal – serogroup B ^b	128	3	7	7	23	36	53	55	95	255 93	234 90	105	100	81	73	54	76	49
Meningococcal – serogroup C ^b	0	4	6	9	8	35	55	55	60	64	38	54	45	24	16	13	10	9
Meningococcal – serogroup W135 ^b	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	4	4	4	2	2	2	5	8	5	2	5
Meningococcal – serogroup Y ^b	120	0	1	1	0	1	0	7	1	7	2	2	5	3	3	1	5	4
Meningococcal – other Mumps ^b	128 8	114 23	139 13	125 11	81 14	89 27	108 29	65 39	61 33	85 92	102 28	53 29	50 35	36 65	40 111	34 155	19 323	14 77
Paratyphoid ^{b,d}	20	8	9	11	12	15	5	9	5	14	11	13	22	10	0	0	0	0
Pertussis	49	217	1534	1405	1369	1156	4246	2309	1416	3692	4439	2011	2772	3568	5811	4921	2100	8756
Pneumococcal disease (invasive) ^b				Decemb							444	862	802	906	641	565	523	548
Psittacosis ^b O fever ^b	Not n 167			Decembe		287	258	236	164	132	38 144	155 310	87 288	81 223	121 143	94 176	35 205	41
Rubella	60	213 324	403 1186	267 233	201 2376	287 636	258 153	236 78	46	132	58	310	288 24	223 18	143	37	205	164 17
Congenital rubella ^b	1	0	2	4	2370	5	0	0	40	0	0	0	1	10	0	0	1	0
Rubella – other ^b	59	324	1184	229	2375	631	153	78	45	191	58	35	23	17	10	37	8	17
Salmonella infection ^{b,d}	1170	802	980	1101	1366	1224	1698	1812	1438	1401	1644	2100	1838	2137	2176	2060	2555	2263
Shigellosis ^b Symbilic				Decembe		662	510	610	504	500	134	85 645	59 830	96 1041	135	75 801	71	109
Syphilis Congenital syphilis	580 1	871 1	730 0	961 2	833 6	662 3	510 3	610 0	584 3	580 2	547 1	645 1	839 3	1041 1	840 6	891 4	1094 4	1034 2
Infectious syphilis ^{b,c}	1	3	6	29	132	72	57	45	86	80	67	128	244	302	242	234	460	416
Syphilis – other ^b	578	867	724	930	695	587	450	565	495	498	479	516	592	738	592	653	630	616
Tetanus	5	2	5	4	0	1	3	3	1	3	0	0	1	1	1	2	2	1
Tuberculosis ^b	429	394	389	394	443	410	422	382	483	448	416	447	386	431	452	466	464	488
Typhoid ^b	38	20 otifiable	28 Auntil F	25 Decembe	27 ar 1006	30	28 0	18 2	32 0	28 1	32 1	26 6	17 3	38 5	28 16	35 10	34 23	43 19
Vorotovin-producing				Jecembe				/	0					2			2.5	19
Verotoxin-producing Escherichia coli infections ^b	Not no	Junabie	- 411611 -				Ŭ	-				°.	5	-	10	10		

^aYear of onset: the earlier of patient reported onset date, specimen date or date of notification. ^bLaboratory-confirmed cases only. ^cIncludes Syphilis primary, Syphilis secondary, Syphilis <<1-year duration and Syphilis newly acquired. ^dFrom 2005, all paratyphoid recorded as salmonellosis. ^eFoodborne illness cases are only those notified as part of an outbreak. NOS: not otherwise specified. No case of the following diseases have been notified since 1991:Plague^b, Diphtheria^b, Granuloma inguinale^b, Lyssavirus^b, Poliomyelitis^b, Rabies, Smallpox, Typhus^b, Viral haemorrhagic fever, Yellow fever.

Table 3. Disease notifications by month of onset of illness^a, NSW, 2008

Condition	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	Мау	Jun.	Jul.	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
Adverse event after immunisation	12	38	65	29	28	12	11	10	23	10	8	2	248
Anthrax	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Arboviral infection Barmah Forest virus ^b	238 59	312 66	310 96	181 65	132 44	84 26	86 24	89 30	92 28	98 26	125 38	104 31	1851 533
Ross River virus ^b	168	233	199	113	76	41	49	30 44	53	55	71	53	1155
Other ^b	11	13	15	3	12	17	13	15	11	17	16	20	163
Blood lead level ≥15 μg/dL ^b	22	15	16	25	51	15	11	16	25	27	17	20	260
Botulism	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brucellosis ^b	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
Chancroid ^b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chlamydia trachomatis infection Congenital chlamydia ^b	1160 1	1309 3	1145 3	1239 6	1235 2	1095 2	1225 4	1161 3	1155 3	1160 3	1125 3	1034 6	14043 39
Chlamydia – other ^b	1159	1306	1142	1233	1233	1093	1221	1158	1152	1157	1122	1028	14004
Cholera ^b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease ^b	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	2	6
Cryptosporidiosis ^b	98	54	60	54	32	26	36	24	19	9	26	46	484
Foodborne illness (NOS) ^e	44	79	86	74	46	100	17	43	17	11	75	75	667
Gastroenteritis (institutional)	436	273	338	493	886	937	1820	2639	1095	629	425	164	10135
Giardiasis ^b Gonorrhoea ^b	159 116	198 113	188 132	158 105	186 110	136 99	147 119	152 122	129 102	106 111	106 107	118 96	1783 1332
Haemolytic uraemic syndrome	0	1	132	3	1	1	1	122	102	0	2	5	1332
Haemophilus influenzae serotype b	Ő	1	0	1	4	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	9
Hib epiglottitis ^b	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Hib meningitis ^b	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Hib septicaemia ^b	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
Hib infection NOS ^b	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	3
Hepatitis A ^b	10	7	5	5	1	3	6	5	7	8	4	8	69
Hepatitis B Hepatitis B – acute viral ^b	215 0	207 2	203 3	229 6	215 4	182 3	215 3	227 5	212 6	256 5	242 2	235 7	2638 46
Hepatitis B – other ^b	215	205	200	223	211	179	212	222	206	251	240	228	2592
Hepatitis C	297	311	287	259	295	339	331	301	374	381	376	365	3916
Hepatitis C – acute viral ^b	0	2	2	0	2	1	3	1	4	2	5	2	24
Hepatitis C – other ^b	297	309	285	259	293	338	328	300	370	379	371	363	3892
Hepatitis D ^b	0	1	1	1	4	1	0	2	1	2	1	0	14
Hepatitis E ^b	2	2	1	0	1	0	2	1	1	1	3	0	14
HIV infection ^b	31 14	31	33 50	22 38	26 74	34 71	27 232	20 423	18 442	29 225	26 128	25 90	322 1813
Influenza Influenza – Type A ^b	7	26 14	30	23	42	29	232 74	425	442 143	129	82	90 61	744
Influenza – Type B ^b	4	8	12	10	24	37	147	305	287	83	35	19	971
Influenza – Type A & B ^b	2	2	2	2	6	4	11	8	12	13	10	9	81
Influenza – Type NOS ^b	1	2	6	3	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	17
Legionellosis	6	9	9	6	12	6	3	7	5	6	10	10	89
L. longbeachae ^b	4	4	4	2	9	3	3	5	4	2	6	5	51
L.pneumophila ^b	2	4	5	4	3	3	0	2 0	1	4	4	5	37
Legionnaires' disease – other Leprosy	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	1 4
Leptospirosis ^b	2	0	2	3	1	2	3	1	0	1	1	1	17
Listeriosis ^b	9	3	4	2	3	1	5	0	3	2	0	2	34
Lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV) ^b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Malaria ^b	7	10	10	12	10	10	17	9	5	6	9	11	116
Measles	4	7	4	6	14	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	39
Measles – laboratory confirmed	4	6	4	4	12	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	34
Measles – other Meningococcal disease	0 3	1 2	0	2 3	2 4	0 11	0 15	0 11	0 15	0 4	0 5	0 5	5 81
Meningococcal – serogroup B ^b	3	2	0	1	4	8	13	7	10	4	3	1	49
Meningococcal – serogroup C ^b	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	2	0	1	1	9
Meningococcal – serogroup W135 ^b	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	5
Meningococcal – serogroup Y ^b	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	4
Meningococcal – other	0	0	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	1	0	2	14
Mumps ^b	27	13	8	2	5	3	3	2	6	2	4	2	77
Pertussis Pneumococcal disease (invasive) ^b	232 16	204 18	245 26	295 38	351 52	350 70	512 66	564 80	872 72	1340 34	1790 42	2001 34	8756 548
Prietracosis ^b	10	2	20 4	58 4	52	70 5	2	80 7	3	54 2	42	54 4	548 41
Q fever ^b	12	15	17	10	10	5	14	22	10	14	18	17	164
Rubella	0	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	1	2	17
Congenital rubella ^b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rubella – other ^b	0	0	0	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	1	2	17
Salmonella infection ^{b,d}	226	239	285	248	192	104	145	120	110	136	215	243	2263
Shigellosis ^b	6	9	7	7	5	6	6	10	16	10	15	12	109
Syphilis	70	98	92	91	88	79	83	79	81	105	81	87	1034
Congenital syphilis Infectious syphilis ^{b,c}	0 28	0 49	0 40	0 36	1 35	0 39	0 30	1 31	0 30	0 35	0 31	0 32	2 416
Syphilis – other ^b	28 42	49 49	40 52	36 55	35 52	39 40	30 53	31 47	30 51	35 70	3 I 50	32 55	416 616
Tetanus	42 1	49 0	52 0	55 0	52 0	40	55 0	47	0	0	50 0	55 0	1
Tuberculosis ^b	62	44	41	52	31	29	46	40	55	32	30	26	488
Typhoid ^b	3	4	3	3	8	1	1	4	2	5	4	5	43
Verotoxin-producing	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	2	6	19
Escherichia coli infections ^b													

^aYear of onset: the earlier of patient reported onset date, specimen date or date of notification. ^bLaboratory-confirmed cases only. ^cIncludes Syphilis primary, Syphilis secondary, Syphilis <1-year duration and Syphilis newly acquired. ^dIncludes all paratyphoid cases. ^eFoodborne illness cases are only those notified as part of an outbreak. NOS: not otherwise specified. No case of the following diseases have been notified since 1991: Plague^b, Diphtheria^b, Granuloma inguinale^b, Lyssavirus^b, Poliomyelitis^b, Rabies, Smallpox, Typhus^b, Viral haemorrhagic fever, Yellow fever.

Table 4. Disease notifications by area health service of residence (including breakdown by 2005 AHS boundaries), crude rates per 100 000 population, NSW, 2008

Condition	Greater	r Southern ^f	ern ^f Greater Western ^f		Hunter Ne	w England ^f	North Co	ast ^f	
	Albury	Goulburn	Broken Hill	Dubbo	Bathurst	Newcastle	Tamworth	Port Macquarie	Lismore
Adverse event after immunisation	5.6	6.2	4.4	3.9	10.4	2.4	2.8	0.7	3.5
Anthrax	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Arboviral infection	65.5	21.8	150.8	122.2	24.8	57.7	67.3	75.3	131.5
Barmah Forest virus ^b Ross River virus ^b	3.4	6.7	22.2	8.7	0.6	19.8	11.8 52.7	41.4 32.5	66.4 61.9
Other ^b	61.8 0.4	13.3 1.9	128.6 0.0	112.6 1.0	23.1 1.2	36.7 1.2	2.8	52.5 1.4	3.1
Blood lead level ≥5 µg/dL ^b	4.1	1.0	33.3	77.0	6.3	6.3	1.7	0.3	2.4
Botulism	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Brucellosis ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0
Chancroid ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Chlamydia trachomatis infection Congenital chlamydia ^b	184.6 1.5	146.7 0.0	399.1 0.0	229.0 0.0	193.1 0.6	260.5 1.4	276.3 1.1	148.1 0.0	228.5 0.0
Chlamydia – other ^b	183.1	146.7	399.1	229.0	192.5	259.1	275.2	148.1	228.5
Cholera ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Cryptosporidiosis ^b Foodborne illness (NOS) ^e	6.0 20.6	1.4 0.0	0.0 0.0	5.8 0.0	11.0 0.0	5.6 14.8	11.2 0.0	4.5 26.7	9.4 0.0
Gastroenteritis (institutional)	72.6	90.2	59.9	85.6	207.5	225.7	22.4	13.3	84.2
Giardiasis ^b	15.0	18.0	11.1	35.6	20.8	29.0	18.5	10.3	4.2
Gonorrhoea ^b	4.1	2.9	6.7	9.6	1.7	17.4	4.5	4.8	11.1
Haemolytic uraemic syndrome	0.0	0.5	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.7	0.0
Haemophilus influenzae serotype b Hib epiglottitis ^b	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.6 0.0	0.2 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0
Hib meningitis ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hib septicaemia ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hib infection NOS ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hepatitis A ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.4
Hepatitis B Hepatitis B – acute viral ^b	8.6 0.4	13.8 1.4	46.6 6.7	9.6 2.9	2.9 0.6	9.9 0.9	7.9 0.0	5.5 0.0	6.3 0.7
Hepatitis B – other ^b	8.2	12.3	39.9	6.7	2.3	9.0	7.9	5.5	5.6
Hepatitis C	52.8	49.8	82.0	59.7	47.3	56.3	37.6	49.6	74.4
Hepatitis C – acute viral ^b	0.8	0.5	0.0	3.9	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.3	0.0
Hepatitis C – other ^b	52.1	49.4	82.0	55.8	47.3	55.3	37.6	49.3	74.4
Hepatitis D ^b Hepatitis E ^b	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	1.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0
HIV infection ^b	1.1	1.4	0.0	1.0	1.2	1.7	1.7	2.7	1.4
Influenza	31.5	36.1	11.1	20.2	17.3	30.5	29.7	16.8	66.8
Influenza – Type A ^b	13.5	18.0	4.4	8.7	9.2	8.9	11.2	5.1	20.2
Influenza – Type B ^b	17.2	17.1	6.7	11.6	6.3	21.7	17.9	9.6	40.4
Influenza – Type A & B ^b Influenza– Type NOS ^b	0.0 0.8	1.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	1.7 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.6 0.0	2.1 0.0	2.1 4.2
Legionellosis	1.1	1.4	0.0	0.0	2.3	1.5	1.7	1.0	1.1
L. longbeachae ^b	0.8	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	1.0	1.1	0.7	0.7
L. pneumophila ^b	0.4	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.4
Legionnaires' disease – other	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0
Leprosy Leptospirosis ^b	0.0	1.0	0.0	3.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
Listeriosis ^b	0.0	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4
Lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV) ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Malaria ^b	1.1	1.9	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.9	1.1	1.7	0.4
Measles Measles – laboratory confirmed	0.0 0.0	0.5 0.5	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0
Measles – other	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Meningococcal disease	1.9	1.9	0.0	2.9	1.2	1.0	1.1	0.0	1.1
Meningococcal – serogroup B ^b	1.1	1.0	0.0	1.9	0.6	1.0	1.1	0.0	0.4
Meningococcal – serogroup C ^b	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4
Meningococcal – serogroup W135 ^b Meningococcal – serogroup Y ^b	0.0 0.0	0.5	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0
Meningococcal – other	0.4	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4
Mumps ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.6	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.4
Pertussis	114.6	96.8	119.7	177.1	74.9	82.4	47.6	73.6	295.0
Pneumococcal disease (invasive) ^b Psittacosis ^b	8.2 1.9	8.1 0.0	15.5 0.0	10.6 2.9	13.3 2.9	10.9 1.0	5.6 0.0	3.8 1.0	6.6 0.4
Q fever ^b	1.9 4.9	0.0 6.2	20.0	2.9 15.4	2.9	2.1	0.0 16.8	7.5	0.4 9.4
Rubella	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Congenital rubella ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Rubella – other ^b	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Salmonella infection ^{b,d} Shigellosis ^b	28.1 0.4	23.7 0.5	33.3 0.0	27.9 0.0	20.8 1.2	33.6 0.0	37.0 0.6	30.8 0.7	48.4
Snigellosis ⁵ Syphilis	0.4 2.6	0.5 5.7	73.2	0.0 6.7	2.3	0.0 4.1	0.6 4.5	0.7 5.1	1.4 8.7
Congenital syphilis	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Infectious syphilis ^{b,c}	1.5	0.5	2.2	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.1	0.3	2.4
Syphilis – other ^b	1.1	5.2	71.0	5.8	2.3	3.1	3.4	4.8	6.3
Tetanus	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0
	2.4								
Tuberculosis ^b	3.4	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	0.6	2.7	1.4 0.7
	3.4 0.0 0.4	1.0 0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0 1.0	0.0 0.0 0.0	2.2 0.0 1.0	0.6 0.0 1.7	2.7 0.0 0.0	1.4 0.7 0.4

^aYear of onset: the earlier of patient reported onset date, specimen date or date of notification. ^bLaboratory-confirmed cases only. ^cIncludes Syphilis primary, Syphilis secondary, Syphilis <1-year duration and Syphilis newly acquired. ^cIncludes all paratyphoid cases. ^eFoodborne illness cases are only those notified as part of an outbreak. ^cAHS further divided into the geographical region covered by their component Public Health Unit. NOS:not otherwise specified. No case of the following diseases have been notified since 1991: Plague^b, Diphtheria^b, Granuloma inguinale^b, Lyssavirus^b, Poliomyelitis^b, Rabies, Smallpox, Typhus^b, Viral haemorrhagic fever, Yellow fever.

Table 4. (Continued)

Condition		n Sydney	South Easter		Sydney Sout	th West ^f	Sydn	ey West ^f	Justice
	Centra Gosford	l Coast ^f Hornsby	lllawar Wollongong	ra ^r Randwick	Camperdown	Liverpool	Penrith	Parramatta	Health
Adverse event after immunisation	4.8	2.3	4.2	3.0	2.3	2.9	5.6	4.5	0.0
Anthrax	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Arboviral infection	17.5	5.8	13.5	5.6	4.9	1.9	9.7	6.7	0.0
Barmah Forest virus ^b	4.8	0.6	2.7	0.2	0.8	0.0	0.6	0.3	0.0
Ross River virus ^b Other ^b	11.7 1.0	2.1 3.1	9.3 1.6	1.3 4.0	2.1 2.1	1.1 0.8	6.9 2.2	2.7 3.7	0.0 0.0
Blood lead level $\geq 15 \mu g/dL^b$	1.0	0.6	1.3	1.8	1.7	3.3	5.0	1.5	0.0
Botulism	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Brucellosis ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Chancroid ^b Chlamydia trachomatis infection	0.0 198.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 279.9	0.0 127.9	0.0 148.3	0.0 140.7	0.0 1913.0
Congenital chlamydia ^b	0.3	143.4 0.3	174.3 0.5	300.8 0.2	0.8	0.6	0.0	140.7	0.0
Chlamydia – other ^b	198.3	143.2	173.8	300.6	279.2	127.3	148.3	139.6	1913.0
Cholera ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease ^b	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Cryptosporidiosis ^b Foodborne illness (NOS) ^e	7.6 21.6	9.0 0.0	3.7 20.1	12.3 0.0	3.0 15.4	3.5 0.0	10.3 64.5	7.3 0.0	0.0 175.0
Gastroenteritis (institutional)	211.9	199.1	103.2	115.7	305.3	49.2	192.9	172.7	0.0
Giardiasis ^b	25.7	40.2	23.6	41.2	23.9	14.3	31.2	24.6	25.0
Gonorrhoea ^b	8.3	15.7	8.5	55.4	47.0	10.1	10.6	13.3	62.5
Haemolytic uraemic syndrome	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.1 0.0	0.0
Haemophilus influenzae serotype b Hib epiglottitis ^b	0.6 0.3	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.1 0.0	0.2 0.0	0.1 0.0	0.6 0.0	0.0	0.0 0.0
Hib meningitis ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Hib septicaemia ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0
Hib infection NOS ^b	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0
Hepatitis A ^b	0.6	2.0	1.6	0.7	1.5	1.2	0.3	2.3	0.0
Hepatitis B Hepatitis B – acute viral ^b	9.2 0.0	36.0 0.5	14.6 0.5	48.6 0.7	83.1 1.3	66.0 0.5	12.2 0.3	69.5 0.3	587.5 12.5
Hepatitis B – other ^b	9.2	35.5	14.0	47.9	81.8	65.5	11.8	69.2	575.0
Hepatitis C	56.5	21.2	46.0	49.4	60.0	52.0	43.0	35.6	7250.0
Hepatitis C – acute viral ^b	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.3	62.5
Hepatitis C – other ^b Hepatitis D ^b	56.5 0.0	21.2 0.0	45.8 0.0	49.3 0.2	60.0	51.8 0.4	43.0 0.3	35.3 0.5	7188.0 37.5
Hepatitis E ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0 0.4	0.4	0.3	0.5	37.5 0.0
HIV infection ^b	1.9	3.1	0.8	14.1	14.1	2.0	2.2	3.5	0.0
Influenza	9.8	12.3	23.5	19.4	16.0	16.8	42.7	47.0	37.5
Influenza – Type A ^b	3.5	5.1	11.6	6.7	9.8	6.4	22.1	20.4	25.0
Influenza – Type B ^b Influenza – Type A & B ^b	6.0 0.0	6.8 0.4	10.6 1.3	11.2 1.6	6.0 0.2	10.3 0.0	12.5 8.1	24.6 1.9	12.5 0.0
Influenza – Type NOS ^b	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Legionellosis	1.0	0.9	1.6	1.0	0.8	1.1	2.2	2.2	0.0
L. longbeachae ^b	0.6	0.6	1.1	0.5	0.6	0.2	1.6	0.9	0.0
L. pneumophila ^b	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.8	0.6	1.3	0.0
Legionnaires' disease – other Leprosy	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.0	0.1 0.0	0.0 0.2	0.0 0.1	0.0 0.0	0.0 0.3	0.0 0.0
Leptospirosis ^b	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Listeriosis ^b	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	1.1	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.0
Lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV) ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Malaria ^b Measles	0.6 0.0	2.1 0.4	2.7 0.3	1.2 0.5	3.0 0.8	0.6 2.1	1.6 0.9	2.9 0.6	0.0 0.0
Measles – laboratory confirmed	0.0	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.6	1.8	0.9	0.5	0.0
Measles – other	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.0
Meningococcal disease	1.0	1.1	1.9	1.2	0.4	1.3	2.5	0.8	0.0
Meningococcal – serogroup B ^b	0.6 0.0	0.5 0.3	1.1 0.3	0.6	0.4 0.0	0.8	1.6 0.0	0.4	0.0 0.0
Meningococcal – serogroup C ^b Meningococcal – serogroup W135 ^b	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.1 0.2	0.0	0.1 0.1	0.0	0.1 0.0	0.0
Meningococcal – serogroup W ^b	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Meningococcal – other	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.0
Mumps ^b	0.6	1.0	1.1	3.5	1.9	0.8	0.3	1.3	0.0
Pertussis	125.6	123.6	187.0	121.9	83.7	68.0	195.0	191.0	25.0
Pneumococcal disease (invasive) ^b Psittacosis ^b	9.8 0.3	6.7 0.1	7.1 0.0	6.3 0.2	7.5 0.2	6.9 0.6	8.1 2.2	9.7 0.1	0.0 0.0
Q fever ^b	1.3	0.0	2.9	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	12.5
Rubella	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.0
Congenital rubella ^b	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Rubella – other ^b Salmonella infection ^{b,d}	0.3 44.1	0.7 42.3	0.0 25.4	0.2 32.2	0.6 31.2	0.4 25.9	0.0 29.6	0.1 28.8	0.0 0.0
Shigellosis ^b	44.1 0.3	42.5	1.3	5.2	31.2	1.2	29.6	1.0	0.0
Syphilis	7.9	7.5	7.9	35.4	38.7	15.1	9.4	13.3	187.5
Congenital syphilis	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Infectious syphilis ^{b,c}	1.3	3.0	1.6	24.3	19.7	2.1	2.2	3.2	12.5
Syphilis – other ^b	6.7	4.6	6.4	10.9	19.0	13.0	7.2	10.0	175.0
Totanus	0.0	0.0							
Tetanus Tuberculosis ⁶	0.0 1.6	0.0 6.5	0.0 1.9	0.0 8.5	0.0 13.9	0.0 10.5	0.0 4.4	0.0 17.4	0.0 0.0
Tetanus Tuberculosis ^ь Typhoid ^ь	0.0 1.6 0.0	0.0 6.5 0.3	0.0 1.9 0.0	0.0 8.5 0.6	0.0 13.9 1.5	10.5 1.2	0.0 4.4 0.0	0.0 17.4 2.1	0.0 0.0 0.0
Tuberculosis ^b	1.6	6.5	1.9	8.5	13.9	10.5	4.4	17.4	0.0

^aYear of onset: the earlier of patient reported onset date, specimen date of notification. ^bLaboratory-confirmed cases only. ^cIncludes Syphilis primary, Syphilis secondary, Syphilis <1-year duration and Syphilis newly acquired. ^dIncludes all paratyphoid cases. ^eFoodborne illness cases are only those notified as part of an outbreak. ^fAHS further divided into the geographical region covered by their component Public Health Unit. NOS: not otherwise specified. No case of the following diseases have been notified since 1991:Plague^b, Diphtheria^b, Granuloma inguinale^b, Lysavirus^b, Poliomyelitis^b, Rabies, Smallpox, Typhus^b, Viral haemorrhagic fever, Yellow fever. Table 5.Disease notifications by area health service of residence (including breakdown by 2005 AHS boundaries) of case,NSW, 2008

Condition	Greater	Southern ^f	Great	er Western ^f		Hunter Ne	w England ^f	North Coa	stf
	Albury	Goulburn	Broken Hill	Dubbo	Bathurst	Newcastle	Tamworth	Port Macquarie	Lismore
Adverse event after immunisation	15	13	2	4	18	14	5	2	10
Anthrax	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Arboviral infection	175	46	68	127	43	338	120	220	378
Barmah Forest virus ^b Ross River virus ^b	9 165	14 28	10 58	9 117	1 40	116 215	21 94	121 95	191 178
Other ^b	105	4	0	1	2	7	5	4	9
Blood lead level ≥15 µg/dL ^b	11	2	15	80	11	37	3	1	7
Botulism	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brucellosis ^b Chancroid ^b	0	0	0	0 0	0	0	1 0	0	0
Chlamydia trachomatis infection	493	309	180	238	335	1527	493	433	657
Congenital chlamydia ^b	4	0	0	0	1	8	2	0	0
Chlamydia – other ^b	489	309	180	238	334	1519	491	433	657
Cholera ^b Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease ^b	0	0	0	0	0	0 2	0	0	0
Cryptosporidiosis ^b	16	3	0	6	19	33	20	13	27
oodborne illness (NOS) ^e	55	0	õ	Ő	0	87	0	78	0
iastroenteritis (institutional)	194	190	27	89	360	1323	40	39	242
iiardiasis ^b	40	38	5	37	36	170	33	30	12
ionorrhoea ^b laemolytic uraemic syndrome	11 0	6 1	3 0	10 1	3 0	102 2	8 0	14 2	32 0
laemophilus influenzae serotype b	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Hib epiglottitis ^b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hib meningitis ^b	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Hib septicaemia ^b Hib infection NOS ^b	0	0	0	0 0	0	1 0	0	0	0
epatitis A ^b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
epatitis B	23	29	21	10	5	58	14	16	18
Hepatitis B – acute viral ^b	1	3	3	3	1	5	0	0	2
Hepatitis B – other ^b	22	26	18	7	4	53	14	16	16
epatitis C Hepatitis C – acute viral ^b	141 2	105 1	37 0	62 4	82 0	330 6	67 0	145 1	214 0
Hepatitis C – other ^b	139	104	37	58	82	324	67	144	214
epatitis D ^b	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
epatitis E ^b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IV infection ^b ifluenza	3 84	3 76	0 5	1 21	2 30	10 179	3 53	8 49	4 192
Influenza – Type A ^b	36	38	2	21	16	52	20	15	58
Influenza – Type B ^b	46	36	3	12	11	127	32	28	116
Influenza – Type A & B ^b	0	2	0	0	3	0	1	6	6
Influenza – Type NOS ^b	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12
e gionellosis L. longbeachae ^b	3 2	3 2	0 0	0 0	4 3	9 6	3 2	3	3
L.pneumophila ^b	1	1	0	0	1	3	1	1	1
Legionnaires' disease – other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
eprosy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
eptospirosis ^b steriosis ^b	0	2 3	0	4 0	0	5 0	0	1 0	3
/mphogranuloma venereum (LGV) ^b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
alaria ^b	3	4	õ	1	0	5	2	5	1
easles	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Measles – laboratory confirmed	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Measles – other eningococcal disease	0	0 4	0	0 3	0 2	0	0 2	0 0	0 3
Meningococcal – serogroup B ^b	3	2	0	2	1	6	2	0	1
Meningococcal – serogroup C ^b	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Meningococcal – serogroup W135 ^b	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Meningococcal – serogroup Y ^b	0 1	0	0	0 0	0 1	0	0	0 0	0
Meningococcal – other umps ^b	0	1	0 0	2	1	0 1	0 0	0	1
rtussis	306	204	54	184	130	483	85	215	848
eumococcal disease (invasive) ^b	22	17	7	11	23	64	10	11	19
ittacosis ^b fouor ^b	5	0	0 9	3	5	6	0	3	1
fever ^b Ibella	13 1	13 0	0	16 0	2 0	12 0	30 0	22 0	27 0
Congenital rubella ^b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rubella – other ^b	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Imonella infection ^{b,d}	75	50	15	29	36	197	66	90	139
nigellosis ^b	1	1	0 33	0	2 4	0	1 8	2 15	4
yphilis Congenital syphilis	7 0	12 0	33	7 0	4 0	24 0	8	0	25 0
Infectious syphilis ^{b,c}	4	1	1	1	0	6	2	1	7
Syphilis – other ^b	3	11	32	6	4	18	6	14	18
anus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
uberculosis ^b	9	2	0	0	0	13	1	8	4
yphoid ^b erotoxin-producing <i>Escherichia</i>	0 1	0 0	0 0	0 1	0 0	0 6	0 3	0 0	2
		0	0		0	0	5	0	

^aYear of onset: the earlier of patient reported onset date, specimen date or date of notification. ^bLaboratory-confirmed cases only. ^GIncludes Syphilis primary, Syphilis secondary, Syphilis <1-year duration and Syphilis newly acquired. ^GIncludes all paratyphoid cases. ^FFoodborne illness cases are only those notified as part of an outbreak. ^GAHS further divided into the geographical region covered by their component Public Health Unit. ^GRate is based on a denominator of 8000 persons. ^{In}Includes cases with unknown Public Health Unit. NOS: not otherwise specified. No case of the following diseases have been notified since 1991: Plague^b, Diphtheria^b, Granuloma inguinale^b, Lyssavirus^b, Poliomyelitis^b, Rabies, Smallpox, Typhus^b, Viral haemorrhagic fever, Yellow fever.

Table 5. (Continued)

Condition		n Sydney I Coast ^f	South Easter Illawa		Sydney Sou	th West ^f	Sydn	ey West ^f	Justice	Total
	Gosford	Hornsby	Wollongong	Randwick	Camperdown	Liverpool	Penrith	Parramatta	Health	
Adverse event after immunisation	15	19	16	25	12	24	18	35	0	248
Anthrax	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Arboviral infection	55	47	51	46	26	16	31	52	0	1851
Barmah Forest virus ^b Ross River virus ^b	15 37	5 17	10 35	2 11	4 11	0 9	2 22	2 21	0 0	533 1155
Other ^b	3	25	6	33	11	7	7	29	0	163
Blood lead level ≥ 15 µg/dL ^b	3	5	5	15	9	28	16	12	0	260
Botulism	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brucellosis ^b Chancroid ^b	0 0	0 0	0	0	0	1 0	0	0	0	2
Chlamydia trachomatis infection	626	1163	659	2476	1489	1076	0 476	1099	153	0 14043
Congenital chlamydia ^b	1	2	2	2 0	4	5	0	8	0	39
Chlamydia – other ^b	625	1161	657	2474	1485	1071	476	1091	153	14004
Cholera ^b	0 1	0	0 1	0	1	0	1	0	0	2
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease ^b Cryptosporidiosis ^b	24	1 73	14	0 101	0 16	29	0 33	0 57	0	6 484
Foodborne illness (NOS) ^e	68	0	76	0	82	0	207	0	14	667
Gastroenteritis (institutional)	668	1615	390	952	1624	414	619	1349	0	10135
Giardiasis ^b	81	326	89	339	127	120	100	192	2	1783
Gonorrhoea ^b Haemolytic uraemic syndrome	26 0	127 2	32 1	456 0	250 2	85 4	34 1	104 1	5 0	1332 17
Haemophilus influenzae serotype b	2	2	0	1	2	4	2	0	0	9
Hib epiglottitis ^b	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Hib meningitis ^b	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
Hib septicaemia ^b	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	3
Hib infection NOS ^b Hepatitis A ^b	1 2	0 16	0 6	0 6	1 8	0 10	1	0 18	0	3 69
Hepatitis B	29	292	55	400	442	555	39	543	47	2638
Hepatitis B – acute viral ^b	0	4	2	б	7	4	1	2	1	46
Hepatitis B – other ^b	29	288	53	394	435	551	38	541	46	2592
Hepatitis C	178 0	172 0	174 1	407 1	319 0	437 1	138 0	278 2	580 5	3916 24
Hepatitis C – acute viral ^b Hepatitis C – other ^b	178	172	173	406	319	436	138	276	575	3892
Hepatitis D ^b	0	0	0	2	0	3	1	4	3	14
Hepatitis E ^b	0	1	1	1	2	3	1	5	0	14
HIV infection ^b Influenza	6 31	25 100	3 89	116 160	75 85	17 141	7 137	27 367	0 3	322 1813
Influenza – Type A ^b	11	41	44	55	52	54	71	159	2	744
Influenza – Type B ^b	19	55	40	92	32	87	40	192	1	971
Influenza – Type A & B ^b	0	3	5	13	1	0	26	15	0	81
Influenza – Type NOS ^b Legionellosis	1 3	1 7	0 6	0 8	0 4	0 9	0 7	1 17	0	17 89
L. longbeachae ^b	2	5	4	4	3	2	5	7	0	51
L. pneumophila ^b	1	2	2	3	1	7	2	10	0	37
Legionnaires' disease – other	0 0	0 0	0	1 0	0 1	0	0	0	0	1 4
Leprosy Leptospirosis ⁶	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2 0	0	17
Listeriosis ^b	1	3	2	5	6	5	2	6	0	34
Lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV) ^b	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Malaria ^b Measles	2 0	17 3	10 1	10 4	16 4	5 18	5 3	23 5	0	116 39
Measles – laboratory confirmed	0	3	1	4	3	15	3	4	0	34
Measles – other	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	5
Meningococcal disease	3	9	7	10	2	11	8	6	0	81
Meningococcal – serogroup B ^b Meningococcal – serogroup C ^b	2 0	4 2	4	5 1	2	7 1	5 0	3 1	0	49 9
Meningococcal – serogroup W135 ^b	Ő	0	0	2	Ő	1	1	0	0	5
Meningococcal – serogroup Y ^b	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	4
Meningococcal – other	1	3	0	1	0	1	2	2	0	14
Mumps ^b Pertussis	2 396	8 1002	4 707	29 1003	10 445	7 572	1 626	10 1492	0 2	77 8756
Pneumococcal disease (invasive) ^b	31	54	27	52	40	58	26	76	0	548
Psittacosis ^b	1	1	0	2	1	5	7	1	0	41
Q fever ⁶ Rubella	4 1	0 6	11 0	2 2	0 3	0 3	0 0	2 1	1 0	164 17
Congenital rubella ^b	0	0	0	2	3 0	3 0	0	0	0	0
Rubella – other ^b	1	6	Ő	2	3	3	0	1	0	17
Salmonella infection ^{b,d}	139	343	96	265	166	218	95	225	0	2263
Shigellosis ^b Suphilie	1	12	5	43	17	10	0	8	0	109
Syphilis Congenital syphilis	25 0	61 0	30 0	291 1	206 0	127 0	30 0	104 1	15 0	1034 2
Infectious syphilis ^{b,c}	4	24	6	200	105	18	7	25	1	416
Syphilis – other ^b	21	37	24	90	101	109	23	78	14	616
Tetanus Tubaraulasiak	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Tuberculosis ^b Typhoid ^b	5 0	53 2	7 0	70 5	74 8	88 10	14 0	136 16	0	488 43
Verotoxin-producing	1	1	0	1	2	1	1	0	0	19
Escherichia coli infections ^b										

^aYear of onset: the earlier of patient reported onset date, specimen date or date of notification. ^bLaboratory-confirmed cases only. ⁴Includes Syphilis primary, Syphilis secondary, Syphilis <<1-year duration and Syphilis newly acquired. ⁴Includes all paratyphoid cases. ^eFoodborne illness cases are only those notified as part of an outbreak. ⁴AHS further divided into the geographical region covered by their component Public Health Unit. ⁹Rate is based on a denominator of 8000 persons. ^bIncludes cases with unknown Public Health Unit. NOS:not otherwise specified. No case of the following diseases have been notified since 1991:Plague^b, Diphtheria^b, Granuloma inguinale^b, Lyssavirus^b, Poliomyelitis^b, Rabies, Smallpox, Typhus^b, Viral haemorrhagic fever, Yellow fever.

• Higher rates of bloodborne diseases and sexually transmissible infections (e.g. chlamydia, syphilis and hepatitis B and C) were reported for Justice Health compared with the rest of NSW. This is likely to be related to testing for these diseases on entry into correctional facilities. Within the prison population, hepatitis C was the most commonly reported infection, likely related to risk factors among people who are incarcerated.

Age distribution of notifiable diseases

- Gastrointestinal and respiratory diseases were most commonly reported in children aged under 5 years. This may be partly due to high testing rates for these diseases in children.
- Pertussis notifications were highest in the group aged 5–24 years, affected both sexes equally, and were also high in females aged 25–44 years, perhaps reflecting increased testing and/or infection of women of child-bearing age.

- Pertussis was also the most commonly reported notifiable disease in adults aged 65 years and older.
- Chlamydia was most common in the group aged 5–24 years, with females accounting for twice as many notifications as males. This is likely to be partly due to higher screening rates for chlamydia in women.

Outbreaks and threats

Several notable disease outbreaks and threats were reported in 2008 in NSW. These included:

- An outbreak of pertussis which first appeared in northern NSW. The highest age-specific incidence was seen in children aged under 1 year.³
- There were five strains of influenza circulating in 2008, with an epidemic of influenza B. An earlier peak of influenza than seen in previous years may have been due to the influx of overseas travellers for World Youth Day in July.




Figure 1. The five most commonly reported notifiable diseases by geographical area of residence at the time of notification in NSW, 2008. [#]Includes Greater Southern, Greater Western, Hunter New England (Tamworth region) and North Coast Area Health Services. ^{##}Includes Northern Sydney Central Coast (Gosford region), South Eastern Sydney Illawarra (Wollongong region) and Hunter New England (Newcastle region) Area Health Services. ^{*}Refers to notifications of *Chlamydia trachomatis*. ^{**}Includes Northern Sydney Central Coast (Hornsby region), South Eastern Sydney Illawarra (Randwick region), Sydney South West and Sydney West Area Health Services. Source: NSW Notifiable Diseases Database.

Table 6. Disease notifications by age group and sex of case, NSW, 2008

Condition	0-4	years	5-24	years	25-44	years	45-64	1 years	≥65	vears	Tot	tal	Total ^e
	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	. orall
Adverse event after immunisation	23	27	142	4	15	1	21	5	8	0	209	37	248
Anthrax	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Arboviral infection Barmah Forest virus ^b	3 0	4 0	117	95	360	336	342	377	104	109	926	921	1851
Ross River virus ^b	2	4	22 75	29 56	95 232	86 217	106 218	128 212	30 70	36 66	253 597	279 555	533 1155
Other ^b	1	0	20	10	33	33	18	37	4	7	76	87	163
Blood lead level ≥15 µg/dL ^b	9	16	3	35	4	112	4	62	1	12	21	237	260
Botulism Brucellosis ^b	0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0	0 1	0 0	0 1	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 2	0 2
Chancroid ^b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chlamydia trachomatis infection	32	26	5438	2612	2380	2850	204	433	7	24	8061	5945	14043
Congenital chlamydia ^b	17	17	1	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	19	20	39
Chlamydia – other ^b Cholera ^b	15 0	9 0	5437 0	2611 0	2379 0	2848 0	204 0	433 2	7 0	24 0	8042 0	5925 2	14004 2
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease ^b	0	0	Ő	0	0	0	1	2	0	3	1	5	6
Cryptosporidiosis ^b	73	100	68	72	74	48	19	13	9	7	243	240	484
Giardiasis ^b Gonorrhoea ^b	173 0	285 1	159 105	191 257	338 109	252 651	147 23	129 169	60 3	46 12	877 240	903 1090	1783 1332
Haemolytic uraemic syndrome	6	1	105	4	109	0	23	0	1	1	11	6	1332
Haemophilus influenzae serotype b	1	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	2	2	3	6	9
Hib epiglottitis ^b	0	0 0	0 0	1 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Hib meningitis ^b Hib septicaemia ^b	1 0	0	0	1	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 1	0 2	1 1	1	2 3
Hib infection NOS ^b	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	Ő	1	0	1	2	3
Hepatitis A ^b	1	1	12	18	9	15	3	3	5	2	30	39	69
Hepatitis B Hepatitis B – acute viral ^b	4	6 0	187 8	219 3	650 1	766 22	255 2	411 5	55 1	61 4	1151 12	1463 34	2638 46
Hepatitis B – other ^b	4	6	179	216	649	744	253	406	54	57	1139	1429	2592
Hepatitis C	11	10	221	215	738	1340	420	813	67	61	1457	2439	3916
Hepatitis C – acute viral ^b	1	0	3	2	10	6	2	0	0	0	16	8	24
Hepatitis C – other ^b Hepatitis D ^b	10 0	10 0	218 0	213 1	728 0	1334 7	418 2	813 4	67 0	61 0	1441 2	2431 12	3892 14
Hepatitis E ^b	Ő	Ő	2	4	1	4	0	2	1	Ő	4	10	14
HIV infection ^b	0	0	8	29	20	192	3	64	1	5	32	290	322
Influenza Influenza – Type A ^b	113 27	139 39	195 69	198 66	229 102	184 76	243 121	160 84	162 75	181 80	943 395	863 345	1813 744
Influenza – Type B ^b	84	100	122	123	114	100	102	61	73	88	496	473	971
Influenza – Type A & B ^b	2	0	4	7	11	8	15	9	13	12	45	36	81
Influenza – Type NOS ^b	0	0	0	2	2	0	5	6	0	1	7	9	17
Legionellosis L. longbeachae ^b	0	0 0	0 0	0 0	3 2	7 3	15 8	24 14	13 7	27 17	31 17	58 34	89 51
L. pneumophila ^b	Ő	Ő	Ő	0	1	4	7	10	5	10	13	24	37
Legionnaires' disease – other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
Leprosy Leptospirosis ^b	0	0 0	1	0 2	0 0	2 5	0 0	0 8	0 0	1	1 1	3 16	4 17
Listeriosis ^b	2	2	1	1	5	3	3	5	5	7	16	18	34
Lymphogranuloma venereum (LGV) ^b	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
Malaria ^b Measles	1 2	2 7	12 7	24 9	11 6	33 8	6 0	22 0	1	3 0	31 15	84 24	116 39
Measles – laboratory confirmed	2	6	7	9 6	6	8 7	0	0	0	0	15	24 19	39
Measles – other	0	1	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	5
Meningococcal disease	12	14	15	15	4	6	8	2	3	2	42	39	81
Meningococcal – serogroup B ^b Meningococcal – serogroup C ^b	11 0	8 1	10 2	8 2	3 0	4 0	4 1	1 1	0 2	0 0	28 5	21 4	49 9
Meningococcal – serogroup W135 ^b	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	3	5
Meningococcal – serogroup Y ^b	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	2	4
Meningococcal – other Mumps ^b	0 2	3 4	1 9	3	1 19	2 23	3 6	0 1	0 0	1 0	5 36	9 41	14
Pertussis	2 611	4 595	9 1770	13 1682	1132	23 685	938	657	399	270	4850	3889	77 8756
Pneumococcal disease (invasive) ^b	39	57	16	14	27	47	58	85	108	96	248	299	548
Psittacosis ^b	0	0	2	0	5	1	12	14	4	3	23	18	41
Q fever ^b Rubella	0 1	0 1	5 2	9 1	16 4	42 6	19 0	57 2	4 0	12 0	44 7	120 10	164 17
Congenital rubella ^b	0	0	0	0	4 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rubella – other ^b	1	1	2	1	4	6	0	2	0	0	7	10	17
Salmonella infection ^{b,d}	261 3	286 7	302 9	330 6	246 10	235 47	174 7	178 18	136 1	102 1	1119 30	1131 79	2263 109
Shigellosis ^b Syphilis	3	/	9 21	6 46	10	47 395	7 58	18 240	52	ı 104	30 247	79 786	109
Congenital syphilis	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
Infectious syphilis ^{b,c}	0	0	7	27	11	264	3	95	1	8	22	394	416
Syphilis – other ^ь Tetanus	2 0	0 0	14 0	19 0	102 0	131 0	55 0	145 0	51 1	96 0	224 1	391 0	616 1
Tuberculosis ^b	1	1	49	69	90	100	46	58	29	45	215	273	488
Typhoid ^b	4	4	10	6	7	9	3	0	0	0	24	19	43
Verotoxin-producing	3	1	4	2	1	0	1	3	3	1	12	7	19
Escherichia coli infections ^b													

^aYear of onset: the earlier of patient reported onset date, specimen date or date of notification. ^bLaboratory-confirmed cases only. ^cIncludes Syphilis primary, Syphilis secondary, Syphilis <1-year duration and Syphilis newly acquired. ^cIncludes all paratyphoid cases. ^cIncludes cases with unknown age and sex and people who identify as transgender. NOS: not otherwise specified. F: female. M: male. Institutional gastrointestinal outbreaks and foodborne illness are excluded from the table as complete demographic data is not routinely collected.

- There were a number of discrete foodborne salmonella outbreaks, several of which were traced back to raw egg products in a range of foods.³
- There were several clusters of measles cases from January 2008, with 38 cases reported between January and June, compared with four cases reported in the same period in 2007.^{1,2} One was associated with an English language school, one was associated with an under-immunised population in the Blue Mountains, and one was associated with transmission in an emergency department.

Conclusions

Controlling the spread of communicable diseases remains a priority for NSW. Vaccine-preventable diseases and sexually transmissible infections are of particular concern. This is exemplified by the re-emergence of infectious syphilis amongst men who have sex with men and the high rates of chlamydia in young adults.

The transmission of vaccine-preventable diseases, including measles and pertussis, also increased in NSW in 2008 compared with previous years. This highlights the challenge of increasing vaccination rates among adolescents and young adults, as well as the importance of promoting and maintaining high vaccination rates in infants.

We thank all those general and specialist medical practices, laboratories, hospitals, schools, child-care centres, and others who have notified diseases of public health significance to their local public health units for investigation and control.

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Investigation of equine influenza transmission in NSW: walk, wind or wing?

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Abstract: Objectives: An outbreak of equine influenza occurred in New South Wales in 2007. In addition to the local spread of the disease between bordering properties, windborne spread over several kilometres had been postulated as a possible method of transmission in this outbreak. This study aimed to describe potential modes of transmission for a property infected with equine influenza where no apparent epidemiological links to other infected properties were reported. Methods: A semi-structured questionnaire was administered to owners of affected properties. The questionnaire collected detailed transmission-risk information, including personnel movements, equipment sharing, and horse and other animal movements. Results: Interviews with property owners from one geographic area suggested the potential for birds and other animals - rather than wind - to facilitate transmission of equine influenza. Conclusion: This study described the potential for mechanical spread of equine influenza. Further research, including laboratory testing of bird plumage following contact with infected horses, may be useful to confirm the possibility of avian fomite transmission.

In August 2007, the New South Wales (NSW) Department of Primary Industries (DPI) identified an outbreak of equine influenza (EI) in the Sydney area. More than 5000 properties in NSW were eventually affected by the equine influenza A, H3N8 virus. While the mode of transmission of EI is incompletely understood, the virus is thought to be transmitted via droplets from infected, coughing horses.¹ The virus can survive on skin, fabrics and surfaces of contaminated equipment, but survival in the air may be reduced in conditions of high relative humidity (Table 1).¹ Animals other than horses are not thought to be epidemiologically significant for the spread of EI.

Infected, coughing horses have been reported to spread the EI virus 35 m and possibly further under favourable air and wind-drift conditions.¹ In an outbreak of EI in 1965, horses segregated 27.4 m away from known infected horses reportedly became infected; however, virus transfer by people or equipment could not be excluded.² Virus spread by humans and fomites may have played a significant role in the spread of EI in the 2007 outbreak in NSW (Table 1).³ An enquiry into the outbreak found that the virus most likely left the Eastern Creek Quarantine Station on the contaminated clothing or equipment of a person who had been in contact with an infected horse.⁴

In addition to the local spread of EI between bordering properties, windborne spread of EI over several kilometres – dependent on atmospheric and climatic conditions – had been postulated as a possible method of transmission in the 2007 outbreak in NSW.⁵ Anecdotal reports of windborne spread over distances of up to 8 km have been suggested during outbreaks in South Africa in 1986 and Jamaica in 1989, although other modes of transmission such as contaminated personnel and equipment could not be excluded.^{6,7} Direct contact with infected horses and contaminated equipment and associated personnel were identified as the most important factors in the rapid spread of EI in the South African outbreak in 1986.⁸

Windborne spread of infection has not been reported for human influenza viruses and, as such, the 2007 EI outbreak presented a unique opportunity to understand the potential for the windborne spread of influenza that may be relevant to both horses and humans.

The NSW *Exotic Diseases of Animals Act 1991* requires anyone with contact with infected horses or horse products (including objects or vehicles) to comply with disinfection guidelines.⁹ Penalties, including fines or imprisonment, apply to people who do not comply. Information was

Surface	Conditions required	Length of virus viability
Fabric/clothing	Humidity of 35–40% Temperature of 28°C	8–12 hours
Stainless steel or plastic	Humidity 35–40% Temperature of 28°C	24–48 hours
Tap water (pH 7.0)	Temperature up to 37°C	2 days
Soil	In dark storage Temperature of 18°C	24 hours
Soil	In direct sunlight Temperature of 15°C	8 hours
Source: Animal Health Australia	. Disease strateov: Equine influenza (V	ersion 3.0) Australian Veterinary

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Source: Animal Health Australia. Disease strategy: Equine influenza (Version 3.0). Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN), Edition 3. Canberra: Primary Industries Ministerial Council; 2007.

provided to property owners regarding disinfection practices and on-farm biosecurity measures. Property owners who suspected that their horses had been infected with EI were required, under the Act, to contact their local veterinarian or the DPI disease hotline.¹⁰

During the outbreak some infected properties were geographically isolated from known infected properties and restricted areas, and had no apparent epidemiological links to a source of infection. These properties presented an opportunity to explore factors that may have been associated with transmission, including the likelihood of windborne spread.

In this study we aimed to describe potential modes of transmission for a property infected with EI where there were no apparent epidemiological links to other infected properties.

Methods

The study area was located on the south-western outskirts of Sydney in NSW. The area was chosen because it contained several infected properties geographically separate from infected properties with known epidemiological links. The area was also located near the Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) where the investigation team was based.

Epidemiologists from the LDCC and NSW Health reviewed the case-file information to collect onset dates and identify infected properties from the study area. Properties with no known epidemiological links to an infected property were determined through case-note review and discussion with field veterinarians involved in the initial investigation. Outbreak maps developed by DPI using the FrontGate Geographical Information System program were used to locate infected and neighbouring properties.¹¹ Daily weather observations from an airport, approximately 6 km north-east of the study group, were used as a proxy measure for the area of interest.

A semi-structured questionnaire was developed to collect detailed transmission-risk information including personnel movements, equipment sharing, and horse and other animal movements. The questionnaire was administered to owners of infected properties to identify potential epidemiological links. The questionnaire was administered via a telephone interview or in person at property boundaries because of biosecurity measures and the risk of infection for non-infected properties. One property (property E) was studied in detail because of its apparent geographical separation from other infected properties. Owners of properties with no horses (as reported by neighbours) were not interviewed. Interviews were conducted in October 2007.

Results

Four properties within a 1 km radius in this area (properties A, B, C and D) reported EI infection to the DPI. The first case (property A) reported the onset of symptoms as 4 September 2007. This property was subsequently found to have epidemiological links to Centennial Park, a significant spread site prior to the statewide lockdown of the movement of horses. Other properties within the study area which shared common boundaries with property A subsequently reported infection (Table 2). Property E reported to the LDCC onset of EI symptoms on 10 September. This property was approximately 1 km from the initial case, with no shared borders or reported close contacts with neighbouring horses.

Property E was a stock horse stud property with 16 horses, including two horses kept on the property by another owner. The property owner reported that all 16 horses eventually developed clinical symptoms of EI. Property E was approximately 1 km away from the nearest known

Table 2.Equine influenza in selected study area properties,
equine influenza outbreak, NSW, 2007

Property	Н	orses	Onset date
	n	% sick	
А	75	100	04/09/2007
В	11	100	06/09/2007
С	6	100	08/09/2007
D	67	67	09/09/2007
E	16	100	10/09/2007
F	8	75	20/09/2007
G	1	0	-
н	0		-
- I	0		-
J	0		-




Figure 1. Selected study area properties, equine influenza outbreak, NSW, 2007. Source: NSW Department of Primary Industries. FrontGate Geographical Information System.

infected property. There are five properties surrounding property E. Of these, three (H, I and J) were reported by the owner of property E to have no resident horses (Figure 1).

The owner reported that none of the horses were moved off property E or shared equipment with other properties in the 10 days prior to the onset of symptoms. He reported that visitors to the property, including the owner of the two agisted horses on the property, had no contact with other horses. Other family members living on the property had minimal contact with the horses and reportedly had no contact with other horses outside property E. All horses on property E were fed grain pellets from a local supplier. The owner reported that there had been no deliveries to the property in the 10 days prior to the onset of symptoms. There was one dog on property E that was reported to visit property F regularly.

The owner stated that he also owned horses on another property 1-2 km away but reported no contact with these horses since the onset of symptoms in horses on property E. The horses on the other property had not displayed any clinical symptoms.

The owner noted that when sick, horses coughed up undigested grain pellets, coughing sputum over the feed. A number of birds had been observed eating this feed and bathing in water troughs. Two dead birds were subsequently seen in the horse yards but were discarded and therefore not available for testing.

Property F first reported symptoms on 20 September (10 days after the onset of illness on property E). The owner reported that six of the eight horses on the property developed clinical symptoms of EI. Property F shared a border with property E, which was likely to have been the source of infection because of its close proximity.

Property G shared a border with property E and had one 30-year-old horse. The horse had not been broken in, no equipment was used (and therefore shared), and the horse had never left the property. The owner onsite had checked the horse daily for clinical symptoms and it was asymptomatic at the time of interview.

Property I reported horses had been kept on the property approximately 12 months before. The owners of properties H and J reported no horses as currently resident onsite.

Daily observations from a weather station approximately 6 km north-east of the study group were used as a proxy measure for the area of interest. Weather conditions during the incubation period for the initial case on property E (estimated from 4 to 10 September) were obtained from the Bureau of Meteorology.¹² The weather station reported rain and easterly and south-easterly winds during this period.

Discussion

This study of geographically separate properties infected with EI with no apparent epidemiological links found that transmission had occurred with a separation of approximately 1 km between known infected properties. Infection still occurred despite the owner on property E reporting implementation of biosecurity measures such as disinfection of equipment and personnel, minimising visitors and their contact with horses and moving horses away from boundary lines.

The owner of property E did not report possible transmission by nose-to-nose contact with infected horses, shared equipment, or visitors to the property with other horse contacts. However, it is difficult to exclude fomite transmission as the source of infection because of reliance on accurate recall and the legal requirements and penalties that could result from disclosing such information.

Interviews with property owners in the study identified the possibility of mechanical transfer of infection by birds or other animals in the spread of EI. Five property owners (A, B, D, E and H) reported an increased number of birds around properties in recent months that were observed eating horse grain and bathing in water troughs. Birds that ate food in and around feed bins may have been exposed to respiratory secretions from infected horses to become a source of mechanical virus transfer. These birds were not available for testing. The owner of property E hypothesised that the birds travelled between stables looking for food, particularly during the current drought when the usual food supplies were limited.

Studies into foot-and-mouth disease transmission have reported that birds may act as potential fomites for mechanical transfer as respiratory secretions – and consequently virus – adhere to feathers.¹³ The foot-and-mouth disease virus is reportedly able to survive for short periods on the body of animals, including for up to 91 hours on the feathers of live birds.¹⁴ The EI virus has been reported to survive in water and soil for varying time periods dependent on temperature and pH;¹ however we were unable to find data on the survival of the virus on feathers or other animals.

While birds are one potential mode of mechanical transfer of EI, it is possible that dogs or other mammals may also facilitate the spread of the EI virus for a short time and distance in the vicinity of an EI outbreak.

The weather conditions reported during the incubation period for property E (rain and south-easterly winds) indicate that windborne transmission of EI from property A would be unlikely. Research into windborne spread of footand-mouth disease found that transmission was reliant on high humidity, low wind speeds, and the absence of heavy rain.¹⁵ Further experimental trials would be necessary to test the feasibility of windborne virus transmission for EI.

There were time delays of approximately 3 weeks between the notification of infection and the interview. This may have resulted in inaccurate recall of information by the property owners. In addition, owners would have been aware of legal requirements of reporting and compliance with biosecurity practices. Owners interviewed in the study were unable to be guaranteed confidentiality, and may have been less likely to report breaches in practice during their interview. Owners of infected properties in only one cluster were interviewed and so these findings may not be generalised. Because of biosecurity measures implemented on infected properties and the risk of infection to reportedly noninfected properties, interviews were limited to either a telephone call or were conducted at property boundaries. Consequently, interviewers were not able to carry out a physical investigation of the properties. The study was, however, able to use the FrontGate Geographic Information System to ascertain property borders.

Conclusion

The hypothesis-generating questionnaires did not identify epidemiological links between these infected properties but described the potential for mechanical spread via birds or other animals. Further research, including laboratory testing of bird plumage following contact with infected horses, may be useful to confirm the possibility of avian fomite transmission. Additional study of clusters in other areas may be useful to better understand the epidemiological features of EI.

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Diagnostic and typing methods for investigating *Legionella* infection

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Abstract: *Legionella* infection is an important cause of community-acquired pneumonia in Australia. Morbidity and mortality is significant. Diagnosis remains a challenge with infection often unrecognised, particularly early in the course of illness. An understanding of available diagnostic methods and their limitations is important to public health practitioners and clinicians alike.

Legionella infections are responsible for 2–15% of community-acquired pneumonia.^{1,2} Morbidity and mortality varies greatly depending on the underlying health of the patient, the promptness of specific therapy and whether the disease is sporadic, nosocomial or part of an outbreak.³ Outbreaks or case clusters occur in communityacquired and nosocomial settings with cooling towers, spas and contaminated hot and cold water plumbing commonly implicated.¹ *Legionella* infections are notifiable throughout Australia, with approximately 300–350 cases reported each year (data from 2001 to 2007).⁴

Numerous diagnostic methods and the typing of isolates are available to assist with epidemiological investigations. This paper will review these methods and how they can be used by public health practitioners to manage potential cases and suspected outbreaks.

Microbiology and clinical spectrum

Legionella spp. are ubiquitous environmental Gramnegative bacteria. They are able to survive in moist environments for long periods of time and grow well at temperatures ranging from 20 to 42° C.⁵ They have an increased tolerance to chlorine and thus enter watersupply systems and proliferate in thermal habitats, including air-conditioning towers, hot water systems, shower heads, taps, spas and respiratory ventilators.⁶ There are currently more than 50 species described, including at least 16 serogroups of *L. pneumophila*.⁵

Infections range from a severe multisystem disease including pneumonia to an asymptomatic infection.^{1,5,7} Pneumonia due to *L. pneumophila* is termed Legionnaires' disease. Worldwide, *L. pneumophila* serogroup 1 is the most common cause of Legionnaires' disease. Pneumonia can be caused by other *Legionella* spp.; *L. longbeachae*, *L. bozemanii*, *L. dumoffii* and *L. micdadei* are the most frequently described.^{1,2,5,8,9} Pontiac fever, a self-limiting nonpneumonic febrile illness, is also described.

In the period 1991–2000 in Australia, *L. pneumophila* was responsible for 51% of cases of clinical disease, with *L. pneumophila* serogroup 1 the most frequently reported pathogen.¹⁰ *L. longbeachae* is another frequent pathogen in Australia, responsible for 42% of the total number of cases.¹⁰

Laboratory diagnosis from clinical specimens

It is not possible to distinguish patients with Legionnaires' disease from other forms of pneumonia by clinical or radiological means.^{11,12} As a result, laboratory confirmation is essential for diagnosis. Although diagnostic methods have improved, no currently available test is able to diagnose all *Legionella* infections in a timely fashion, with a high degree of sensitivity and specificity. The available methods are summarised in Table 1.

Definitive legionellosis is defined by the Public Health Laboratory Network as isolation of *Legionella* spp., detection of *Legionella* antigen in urine, seroconversion or significant increase in serum *Legionella* antibody levels.¹³ Suggestive legionellosis is defined as detection of *Legionella* antigen by direct fluorescent antigen (DFA), detection of *Legionella* DNA by polymerase chain reaction (PCR), or a single high antibody level to *L. pneumophila* or *L. longbeachae*.¹³ These laboratory

Test	Specimen	Sensitivity (%)	Specificity (%)	Laboratory turnaround time	Comments
Culture	Respiratory samples including sputum and BAL	<10-80*	100	3–7 days	Detects all species and serogroups. Species other thar <i>L. pneumophila</i> may be detectable only after 10 days of incubation. ⁶
DFA staining	Respiratory samples including sputum and BAL	25–70*	>95	<4 hours	Technically demanding. Sensitivity consistently less than for culture.
Antigen detection	Urine	70–90	>95	<3 hours	Only reliable for detection of <i>L.pneumophila</i> serogroup 1.
PCR	Respiratory samples including sputum and BAL	80–100	>90	<4 hours	Detects all species and serogroups.
	Serum	30–50	>90		
	Urine	46–86	>90		
Serology	Serum	60–80	>95	3–10 weeks	Must test both acute and convalescent samples. Interpretation of a single sample can be misleading.

Table 1. Comparison of different microbiological methods to diagnose Legionella infection

definitions are used in combination with clinical parameters to identify, for public health purposes, confirmed and probable cases of *Legionella* infection.¹⁴

Culture

Isolation of *Legionella* spp. by culture is considered the 'gold standard' for diagnosis because of its superior specificity. *Legionella* spp. are most frequently isolated from respiratory tract specimens (e.g. sputa, bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL), lung). Lung biopsy specimens have the greatest yield but are rarely performed.⁵ Bronchoscopic samples have a greater diagnostic yield compared with expectorated sputum samples.¹⁵ In most laboratories, polyvalent or monoclonal antisera are used to identify presumptive *L. pneumophila* and *L. longbeachae*.¹³ These techniques are unreliable for other species, owing to a high degree of cross-reactivity between different species with molecular techniques preferred.

The major advantage of culture for diagnosis is that all *Legionella* spp. are able to be detected by this method. A culture isolate is also required for further epidemiological typing or for susceptibility testing.

There are, however, inherent problems with *Legionella* culture because the organism is fastidious and slow growing (often taking 5 days or more to grow).¹³ Specifically formulated media (most frequently buffered charcoal

yeast-extract media) are required to enhance the growth of *Legionella* spp. and suppress other respiratory bacteria. Patients with Legionnaires' disease are often nonproductive of sputum and therefore require invasive procedures to obtain respiratory samples (e.g. BAL fluid). The yield from culture depends on the severity of the illness: 15–25% of mild pneumonia cases are culture positive compared with 95% in cases of severe pneumonia causing respiratory failure.¹⁵ Delays in sputa processing and prior specific antimicrobial therapy decrease the yield.⁵

Fluorescent microscopy

Direct fluorescent-antibody (DFA) staining is a rapid method of directly detecting *Legionella* spp. in respiratory secretions and tissue samples. Although rapid, it is insensitive, requiring large organism numbers for visualisation (i.e. severe disease). Reported sensitivity of fluorescent microscopy varies but is consistently less than that of culture.¹⁵ Furthermore, it is technically demanding, requiring experienced laboratory personnel. False positive results may occur because of cross-reactions with other bacteria and yeasts.⁵ Problems with both sensitivity and specificity have limited the use of DFA staining in most laboratories.

Legionella urinary antigen tests

Soon after *L. pneumophila* was identified as the cause of Legionnaires' disease, it was noted that *Legionella*

The two most frequently used tests have excellent sensitivity and specificity for *L. pneumophila* serogroup 1. The *Legionella* Urinary Antigen EIA (Binax, Inverness Medical: Scarborough, Maine) has a sensitivity of 70–90% and specificity approaching 100% for *L. pneumophila* serogroup 1.^{2,15–17} The ICT membrane assay (NOW *Legionella* Urinary Antigen Test: Binax, Inverness Medical: Scarborough, Maine) is simple to perform, rapid and its sensitivity and specificity are similar to those of EIA.¹⁸ Similar to culture and fluorescent microscopy, an association between clinical severity and test sensitivity occurs.¹⁷ Results can be obtained in 3 hours with the Binax EIA and in 15 minutes with the Binax NOW kits.

Attempts to create a *Legionella* urinary antigen test to detect species and serogroups other than *L. pneumophila* serogroup 1 have been problematic (sensitivity 29–31% for species other than *L. pneumophila* serogroup 1).¹⁹ In particular, no commercial assay is available to reliably detect *L. longbeachae* in urine.

Polymerase chain reaction

PCR-based detection of *Legionella* DNA in sputum, urine and blood has been described.^{1,6,15} PCR amplifies minute amounts of *Legionella* DNA, providing results within a short time and enabling detection of infection caused by all *Legionella* species and serogroups. Molecular methods can be formulated to incorporate real-time or multiplex formats. Despite the availability of commercial assays (e.g. Chlamylege kit, Argene Inc, NY), *Legionella* PCR is available only in a limited number of laboratories in Australia.

When testing clinical samples from the lower respiratory tract, PCR has been shown to have sensitivity equal to or greater than culture.^{20–22} False positive results have been reported using both in-house and commercial assays.⁶ *Legionella* DNA can also be detected from other samples, but with reduced sensitivity (30–86%).¹⁵

Serology

Serological testing for *Legionella* infection is a valuable epidemiological tool but is of less immediate benefit to physicians because of delayed seroconversion. Indirect immunofluorescent assays (IFA) and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISA or EIA) are the most frequently performed tests.¹³ IFA remains the standard reference test and is validated for *L. pneumophila* and

*L. longbeachae.*¹⁵ ELISA assays are designed to provide a sensitive screen for legionellosis and detect IgM using *L. pneumophila* serogroup 1 or *L. longbeachae* sonicated whole cells as antigens.

Using IFA, a cut-off equal to or greater than 1:128 is recommended as evidence of recent or past infection. A single titre of 1:512 or higher for either *L. pneumophila* or L. longbeachae is a sensitive indicator of infection but may represent past infection or, on rare occasions, infection with another species.¹³ The demonstration of seroconversion or a four-fold rise in titre on a convalescent sample is required for diagnosis of definitive Legionella infection. In most cases, seroconversion is detected within 3-4 weeks; however, up to 10 weeks has been reported.²³ A proportion of people with a proven Legionella infection do not develop detectable Legionella antibodies.¹⁵ Crossreactive antibodies are occasionally found in patients with other infections or non-infectious conditions. Clinicians should be encouraged to obtain convalescent samples after a minimum of 3 weeks. If there is no seroconversion after this time and clinical suspicion remains high, an additional convalescent sample should be obtained. IgM measured by ELISA can become positive earlier in the course of illness compared with IFA, although it may remain elevated for years and numerous cross-reactions can occur.¹³

Identification of *Legionella* spp. from environmental specimens

Attempts to culture *Legionella* spp. from environmental sources may be undertaken to investigate a clinical case cluster or as a part of the regular surveillance. An environmental investigation is generally not required following individual cases; however, the decision to investigate should be made by individual public health units, taking local factors into consideration.¹⁴ A number of tools, including electronic maps of registered cooling towers, may be utilised to identify potential point sources (Vicky Sheppeard, pers. comm.).

A number of NATA-registered laboratories process environmental samples for *Legionella*. Culture methods are similar to those used in clinical laboratories. Following heat treatment to reduce growth of other bacteria, an aliquot of water is incubated on selective media. Following growth of suspicious colonies, antisera are used to identify presumptive *L. pneumophila*.

Typing of Legionella isolates

Approximately 4% of community-acquired and 37% of nosocomial *Legionella* infections constitute case clusters.¹ Standard serotyping of isolates is inadequate in epidemiological investigations because *L. pneumophila* serogroup 1 is the predominant organism in outbreaks. Further methods are required for subtyping or differentiation between potentially related strains.

Serological typing to identify 12 'type' strains within *L. pneumophila* serogroup 1 has been described.¹ Not all of the monoclonal antibodies from this panel are available in Australia;¹³ thus, molecular methods are usually preferred.

Various molecular methods are available for genotyping of clinical and environmental *Legionella* isolates in suspected case clusters. These include amplified fragment length polymorphism (AFLP) analysis, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE), restriction fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) analysis and multi-locus sequence typing (MLST). The choice of method depends on the preference of the laboratory performing the test. Compared with DNA fragment-based methods (e.g. AFLP, PFGE or RFLP), DNA sequencing (e.g. MLST) is robust, offers greater reproducibility and allows results to be shared and compared between laboratories.^{5,24}

Subtyping of clinical and, if available, environmental isolates of *Legionella* is a powerful epidemiological tool to identify linked clinical cases and the possible common environmental source. Subtyping of *Legionella* spp. should be performed only if there is clear epidemiological evidence linking more than one case. Given the increasing use of non-culture-based methods, subtyping is limited by the infrequent isolation of *Legionella* spp. in culture. European data indicate that *Legionella* infections were diagnosed by culture in only 10% of cases.⁸

A rational approach to diagnosis

A rational approach to diagnosis is required because of the difficulty in distinguishing *Legionella* infection from other causes of community-acquired pneumonia. A diagnosis is necessary to enable identification and management of potential point sources. Testing algorithms may vary with different situations (e.g. a suspected outbreak compared with isolated cases). As each diagnostic method has limitations, a combination of tests is recommended.¹⁵

Based on the current evidence, it is our opinion that patients presenting with possible acute Legionella infection should have respiratory specimens cultured for Legionella, if available, combined with a Legionella urinary antigen test. Where available, a PCR-based assay to detect Legionella, together with a urinary antigen test, is a sensitive alternative; however, culture should still be attempted to obtain an isolate for identification and for genotyping if indicated. Reliance on urinary antigen tests will miss non-L. pneumophila serogroup 1 infections, including L. longbeachae. Fluorescent microscopy has little role, except in patients presenting with severe disease who have a negative Legionella urinary antigen. Serology remains the only method of documenting recent past infection. This may be of particular assistance where an alternative explanation for pneumonia has not been found or for epidemiological investigation of outbreaks where a point source is suspected. When a culture is available, molecular typing of clinical and environmental isolates is a powerful tool for identifying linked clinical cases and any possible common environmental sources.

Conclusion

Well-established methods such as culture for *Legionella* and urinary *Legionella* antigen detection remain the mainstay of diagnosis of *Legionella* infections. Newer methods, including PCR-based assays, are likely to become more widely available in the future. Given the current limitations of laboratory diagnosis, patients presenting with pneumonia will continue to receive empiric therapy against *Legionella*.

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Mass gatherings and public health: preparing for World Youth Day 2008

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This Bug Breakfast seminar was held prior to the World Youth Day activities in Sydney, New South Wales (NSW) in July 2008.

Public health challenges and mass gatherings

Public health preparedness for mass gatherings is essential for the delivery of a safe and healthy event. The World Health Organization recently defined mass gatherings as 'events attended by a sufficient number of people to strain the planning and response resources of a community, state or nation'.¹

Public health challenges at mass gatherings include:

- the potential for communicable disease outbreaks
- mitigation of the risk of crowd crush
- the consideration of the likelihood of a terrorist event
- the likelihood of temperature-related illnesses (hypothermia and/or hyperthermia)
- sanitation
- events where active participation is encouraged (e.g. 'fun runs')
- · access to safe food and water
- the possibility of crowd violence, noise issues, and the likely use and/or misuse of drugs and alcohol.

These challenges are compounded when events are of long duration, where little data relating to past experience with the event exists, and when protocols for managing the type of mass gathering are not readily available.

Some of the mitigation strategies that can be adopted include:

- · rigorous pre-event planning
- regulation
- using appropriate health education strategies
- encouraging appropriate engineering to reduce the health risks to participants

- · encouraging harm minimisation strategies
- encouraging pre-event vaccination
- pre-event surveillance and intelligence-gathering to better assess the risks of a particular event.

Planning for World Youth Day 2008

World Youth Day 2008 (WYD08) is a large-scale international gathering of Catholic youth which is taking place in July 2008. During 'Days in the Dioceses' from 10 to 14 July, participants can visit and undertake a program of activities at Diocese in locations across Australia and New Zealand. Participants will converge in Sydney for a program of major events, which is being held from 15 to 20 July. In Sydney, a large number of participants will stay in shared accommodation on the floors of school halls or commercial facilities.

Extensive public health planning has been undertaken for WYD08. This includes the formation of the WYD08 Public Health Working Party in September 2006, which has served as a conduit for early and regular engagement with key stakeholders including event organisers, laboratory services, local government and fellow government agencies. A public health project officer has been coordinating activities since November 2007, in order to assist all stakeholders in delivering a consistent response to WYD08.

There are significant communicable disease risks with an event of this type, especially considering the prolonged group contact and limited sanitation facilities available at temporary accommodation venues (such as school halls). To minimise the risks to participants, several strategies are being undertaken including encouraging pre-event vaccination and the provision of pre-event information encouraging hand washing and respiratory etiquette amongst pilgrims. Intra-event vaccination clinics may also be deployed (e.g. for Hepatitis A or varicella). A food preparation and inspection program has been developed by the NSW Food Authority, in consultation with local government. Advice has been provided to event organisers regarding the need to provide adequate hand washing facilities and isolation areas for sick participants.

The existing communicable disease surveillance program will be enhanced. Calls to a health advice line for participant accommodation team leaders and presentations to special event onsite medical units will be monitored for conditions of public health interest. The Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing will assist by monitoring for international events that may have an impact on WYD08. Cooperation has been sought from other jurisdictions regarding pre-event health surveillance. The NSW Department of Health and all area health service public health units will remain on high alert and ready to respond to outbreaks of disease during WYD08, using agreed protocols.

Mass gatherings present both challenges and opportunities. Many of the strategies developed for managing WYD08 will be applicable in other public health emergencies, including mass evacuations and large-scale communicable disease outbreaks.

Reference

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Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus

What is methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*?

Staphylococcus aureus (commonly known as 'staph') are common, usually harmless bacteria. Many healthy people carry these bacteria on their skin or in their nose. Sometimes, however, they can cause infection and serious illness. Some strains of staph are resistant to methicillin and other antibiotics. These are known as methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA). MRSA infection is commonly known as 'golden staph'.

What is community-acquired MRSA?

MRSA infections occur frequently among people in hospitals and other health care facilities. Some MRSA strains, known as community-acquired MRSA (CaMRSA), spread readily between people in the community. CaMRSA strains are often quite different to MRSA strains associated with hospitals and may cause infections in otherwise healthy people.

What are the symptoms?

Like ordinary staph, CaMRSA can cause infections:

- of the skin surface (e.g. boils and impetigo (school sores))
- under the skin (e.g. abscesses and cellulitis)
- of the bone, blood, lungs and other parts of the body.

How is it spread?

CaMRSA can get into the body through broken skin or sores, resulting in redness, pimples, swelling, tenderness or boils. Infections can become serious, leading to infections of the blood or pneumonia. CaMRSA can be spread by:

- touching or squeezing an infected body area, such as a boil or open wound
- using towels, clothes or bed sheets that have been used by a person with an MRSA infection
- using grooming items that have been used by a person with an MRSA infection
- not washing your hands carefully.

Who is at risk?

CaMRSA skin infections can affect anyone. Crowding and frequent skin-to-skin contact can increase the risk of infection, so outbreaks tend to occur in schools, dormitories, military barracks, households, jails and child-care centres. Cuts or abrasions, contact with contaminated items and surfaces, and infrequent washing increase the risk of infection. People who have health problems such as diabetes or a poor immune system, or who have broken skin due to wounds or dermatitis, are also more likely to get an infection.

How is it prevented?

- Hand washing is important to prevent the spread of CaMRSA. Hands should be thoroughly washed with soap and running water for 10–15 seconds before and after touching or dressing an infected area, before handling or eating food, after going to the toilet, after blowing your nose and after touching or handling unwashed clothing or linen.
- Cover boils or other skin infections with a waterproof dressing. People who handle food must make sure that they do not contaminate any food and must keep any sores or skin infections completely covered with a waterproof dressing.
- Do not share personal items (e.g. clothes, towels or bed sheets) or grooming items (e.g. nail scissors, tweezers, razors and toothbrushes). If you share a bed with someone, keep sores or wounds covered overnight.

In addition to general hygiene, specific measures exist to help prevent the spread of MRSA in child-care centres, schools and among sporting groups.

MRSA in child-care centres and schools

- Teachers, children and families should understand the importance of hand washing, covering mouths while coughing and staying home if sick.
- Hand washing products (soap dispensers, running water and paper towel) should be available and accessible.
- Activities should allow time for hand washing (before eating and after going to the toilet).
- If open skin wounds cannot be kept covered, temporary exclusion from child care or school may be considered until the wound is healed or drainage of pus from the wounds can be contained using a sealed bandage.
- Surfaces such as counters, desks and toys that come into contact with uncovered or poorly covered infections should be cleaned daily with detergent, and whenever visibly contaminated.

MRSA in sporting groups

- People who have skin infections or open wounds that cannot be kept covered should not participate in contact sports until the wound has healed or drainage can be contained.
- People who have skin infections or open wounds should be excluded from common spas or saunas.
- People who have uncovered skin wounds should not share towels or sports equipment that is in contact with the skin.

How is it diagnosed?

Staph infections are usually diagnosed on the basis of their appearance and the presence of any related symptoms (e.g. fever). To diagnose an infection of MRSA, a doctor will need to take a swab or sample from the boil, wound or other site of infection for laboratory testing.

How is it treated?

Your doctor will advise on the best treatment for your infection. Many CaMRSA skin infections can be treated by draining the abscess or boil. Letting the pus drain out safely is often the only treatment that is needed. Drainage of boils or abscesses should only be performed by a doctor, trained nurse or health worker under sterile conditions. It is important to keep the wound well protected with a waterproof bandage so the infection is not spread to others.

In some circumstances CaMRSA is treated with antibiotics. If you are given an antibiotic, take all doses as instructed, even if the infection improves. It is possible for a CaMRSA skin infection to come back after it appears cured.

What is the public health response?

Public health units can advise on the control of outbreaks. CaMRSA is not a notifiable condition in NSW.

For more information please contact your doctor, local public health unit or community health centre.

This factsheet is available at: http://www.health.nsw.gov.au/factsheets/infectious/methicilresist_staph.html

NSW HEALTH

Communicable Diseases Report, NSW, July and August 2009

Communicable Diseases Branch, NSW Department of Health

For updated information, including data and facts on specific diseases, visit www.health.nsw.gov.au and click on Public Health then Infectious Diseases, or access the site directly at: http:// www.health.nsw.gov.au/publichealth/infectious/ index.asp.

Figure 4 and Tables 2 and 3 show reports of communicable diseases received through to the end of August 2009 in New South Wales (NSW).

Invasive meningococcal disease

Twenty-seven cases of invasive meningococcal disease were reported in July and August in NSW, bringing the total number of cases to 68 so far this year. Two adult deaths were reported during July and August 2009. In comparison to August in 2008, there were 51 cases reported and one death.

There has been a downward trend in meningococcal notifications across all area health services in NSW since 2000. The highest numbers of notifications are reported among children aged less than 5 years at onset, with a second peak in the 15–24 year age group.

A vaccine against meningococcal C was added to the National Immunisation Program Schedule in January 2003. Consequently, serogroup C meningococcal disease is now mainly seen in adults and in unimmunised children. Serogroup B is the most common form of meningococcal disease in NSW. Of the 27 cases notified during July and August, 14 cases were due to serogroup B and two cases were due to serogroup C.

A media alert was released in August, reminding the public to be alert for the symptoms of meningococcal disease during winter and spring, the peak seasons for infection. An alert was also sent to GPs throughout NSW, highlighting the importance of early diagnosis and treatment of meningococcal disease.

Pertussis (whooping cough)

Monthly notifications of pertussis continue to decline steadily from the peak of the outbreak in December 2008. There were 1207 cases notified with onset in July and August, compared with 2082 in the preceding 2 months. The decrease was noted across all area health services in NSW. Comparison of data over time must be undertaken with caution however because of: recent changes in the use of diagnostic technologies (including the increasing use of nucleic acid testing); and changes in case ascertainment over time (related to increased awareness of the disease among doctors and the broader community).

The highest number of cases continue to be reported for children aged less than 15 years at onset, specifically children aged 0–4 and 5–9 years. Because pertussis immunity wanes over time, many older children and adults are susceptible to infection and can be the source of new infections in infants. Timely immunisation of infants is important because unvaccinated infants are at the highest risk of infection and of associated complications.

Since March 2009 and for a limited time in NSW, free pertussis (dTpa) vaccine has been available for: all new parents; couples who are planning a pregnancy; grand-parents; and any other adults who will regularly care for infants aged less than 12 months. From March to August this year, 122 326 letters were sent to new parents in NSW, highlighting the pertussis outbreak and informing them of the availability of the free vaccine.

Measles

One case of measles was notified in July in NSW, bringing the total for the year to 10. This case was reported in an infant (too young for the Measles-Mumps-Rubella (MMR) vaccine) on their return from overseas travel. Thirty-nine cases of measles were notified in 2008. The majority of measles cases notified so far this year have been in young people recently returned from overseas travel, or in their contacts.

Many people born between 1966 and 1980 remain susceptible to measles because most people in this age group have not been exposed to measles infection and those who were routinely immunised typically received only one dose. Two doses are required to provide a high level of protection. Anyone born after 1965 should ensure that they




Figure 1. Number of outbreaks of gastrointestinal illness in institutions (e.g. aged-care facilities, child-care centres, schools, hospitals, etc.) reported to NSW Health for each month between 1 July 2004 and 31 August 2009.

have had two doses of MMR vaccine, unless they know they are immune.

Gastroenteritis in institutions

From 1 July 2004 to 31 August 2009, 747 outbreaks of gastrointestinal illness in institutions, affecting at least 16256 people, were reported to NSW Health. Outbreaks of viral gastroenteritis are more commonly seen in winter months (Figure 1).

In 2009, between 1 July and 31 August, 131 outbreaks of gastrointestinal illness in institutions were reported, affecting 1804 people. This represents a small increase of 4% over the median number of outbreaks reported during the same time period from 2004 to 2008 (n = 126), and a significant decrease of 46% on the median number of people affected as a result of the outbreaks (n = 3340) (Table 1).

Twenty percent of the outbreaks were caused by norovirus, 4% by rotavirus, 1% by *Clostridium difficile* and *Campylobacter* respectively, and 75% were of unknown aetiology but were suspected to have been caused by person-to-person spread of a viral illness after investigating the epidemiological evidence and clinical symptoms of those affected. Fifty-five percent of the outbreaks occurred in aged-care facilities, 24% in hospitals, 20% in child-care centres, and 1% in a military facility.

Data collected on the number of presentations to emergency departments are consistent with the data shown in Table 1.Number of outbreaks of gastrointestinal illness ininstitutions reported to NSW Health between 1 July 2009 and31 August 2009 and number of people affected by these

	Number of outbreaks	Number of people affected
2004	126	3341
2005	23	295
2006	123	3340
2007	132	3265
2008	212	4211
Median 2004–2008	126	3340
2009	131	1804

this report, with no increase in presentations during the time period 1 July–31 August 2009 when compared with data collected from the previous 5 years.

In children aged 0–4 years, presentations to emergency departments for gastrointestinal illness during the period July–August 2009 decreased when compared with earlier years (Figure 2).

This decrease may be due to the introduction of the rotavirus vaccination into the National Immunisation Program in July 2007. The Eastern Sydney Laboratory Surveillance Program, based at the South Eastern Sydney Illawarra Public Health Unit, shows a reduction in the number of cases of rotavirus (Figure 3).




Figure 2. Emergency department visits for gastrointestinal illness in children aged 0–4 years by 4-week counts, ending 30 August 2009.





Figure 3. Number of cases of rotavirus reported each week by Eastern Sydney Laboratory Surveillance Program, 1998–2009.



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Table 2.

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Bloodborne and sexually transmitted	itted																		
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Vectorborne	-	4	-	-	-	5	-			-				:	4	`		2	
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NB: Ifiliuenza data has not been provided here since May 2009. See www.health.nsw.gov.au/PublicHealth/Infectious/a-zasp#l for up-to-date information. NB: From 1 January 2005, Hunter New England AHS also comprises Great Lakes, Gloucester and Greater Taree LGAs (LGA, Local Government Area). Sydney West also comprises Greater Lithgow LGA.	d here since	e May 2009. also compri	See www.he ises Great La	ealth.nsw.gov skes, Gloucest	/.au/PublicH	ealth/Infectic ter Taree LG <i>F</i>	ous/a-z.asp# \s (LGA, Loca	fl for up-to-da al Governmer	ate informati nt Area), Sydr	ion. ney West alsc	o comprises G	ireater Lithgow	/ LGA.						
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NSA, Northern Sydney Area CSA, Cer	tral Sydney	Area WS	A, Western S	Sydney Area	FWA, Far \	West Area	HUN,F	Hunter Area		NRA, Nor.	thern Rivers /	Area ILL, Illa.	warra Area	SWS, South W	estern Sydney	Area JH	S, Justice Hea	Ith Service.	

Table 3. Reports of notifiable conditions received in August 2009 by area health services

	Greater Sol	uthern	Grea	ter Wester	s	Hunter New England		Area Health Service (2009) North Cent	Service (20 No	e (2009) Northern Sydney Central Coast		South Eastern Svdnev Illawarra	Sydney South West	South	Svdnev W	lest		Total For	al Year
Condition	GMA SA	SA	FWA	A MAC MWA	MWA	, NUH		MNC NRA		CA NSA		SES	CSA	SWS	WÉN WSA		JHS A	August ^b	to date ^b
Bloodborne and sexually transmitted	itted																		
Chancroid" Chlamydia (genital)ª	50	23 -	9	20	30	131	34 -	36	- 09	 50 94	63 -	204	_ 116	94	39 -	112	- 9	1177	- 9971
Gonorrhoea ^a	2	I	-	I	I	4	I				4	35	27	14			I	120	1033
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Hepatitis C – other ^a	6	8	9	11	16	42	7			25 26	23	52	40	55	24	31	27	449	4240
Hepatitis D – unspecified ^a	I	I	I	I	I	ī	ī				I	I	ī	I	ī		-	-	9
Lymphogranuloma vanereum Svohilis	1 1	۱m	1 00	I -	- 0	I m	1 1	I -	14	1 0	I -	30 -	- 22	10	- 2		1 1	104	2 828
Vertorborne														2					
Barmah Forest virus ^a	I	I	I	I	ī	5	ī	6	9	2	I	I	I	I	ī	1	1	22	276
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Malariaª	-	-	L	-	I.	-	I.	1	_		I	-		2	I	_	ı.	=	1
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Lyssavirus	I	I	I	I	I	I	T	I	I		I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	: 1
Psittacosis ^a	 .	1.	I	1.0	1.0	I	I	I		1	I	I	I	I	I	I	I		20
Q fever ^a	-	-	•	2	2	1	1	I	2		'	T	ı.	•	•		1	∞	109
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Legionella pneumophila infection ^a					- 1							- 1	v 1			v 1			24
Legionnaires' disease (other) ^a		ī	I	ī	ī	ī	ī	I	ī	1	I	I	ī	ī	ī	ī	1	1	2
Leprosy		1.	I	I.	1.	1.0	I.	1.	ī	1	1.	1.0	1.0	1.	ī	I.	T	1	I Į
Meningococcal infection (invasive) ^a Tuberculosis	[- ~	1 1	1 1	- 1	- 17	1 1	- I	I -			~ ~	m r	- ~	1 1	- 4	1 1	13 75	67 273
Varriao aronatablo	-	4				-			-	-	-	0	4	4		-		2	
Adverse event after immunisation	e.	I	I	I	I	I	I			-	I	I	I	-	, -	.	1	7	98
H. influenzae b infection (invasive) ^a		I	I	I	I	I	I				I	I	I	· I	· I	· I	I	. 1	9
Measles	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	1	I	I	I	I	I	1 0	1	1 0	10
Pertussis	27	1 88	1 00	10	35	- 63	21				32	63	35	30	- 49	24		620	10654
Rubella ^a	i'	-	1	. 1	1	1	, '				1	1	1	1	<u> </u>	. 1	1	2	∞
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Verotoxin producing E. coli ^a	I	I	I	I	I	-	I	I	I	1	I	• 1	I	• 1	I	• 1	I	·	. 8
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Meningococcal conjunctivitis	L	1	ī	'	ī	'	1	T		T T	L	T	ı	'			1	ı	
^a Laboratory-confirmed cases only. ^b lnci	udes cases wit.	h unknowi	n postcode. 4	Data is incom	plete.	:								:					
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NB: Influenza data instructuse in provided here since May 2009. See www.health.nsw.gov.au/PublicHealth/Infectious/a-z.asp#l for up-to-date information.	ed here since N	1ay 2009. 5	ee www.hea	Ith.nsw.gov.a	u/PublicHe	alth/Infection	l#dse-z-e/sr	for up-to-date	information	-									
NB: From 1 January 2005, Hunter New NB: HIV and AIDS data are reported sec	england AHS al	vublic Heal:	ses Great Lak th Bulletin gu	es, Glouceste Iarterly.	er and Great	er laree LGA	s (LGA, Loca	overnment <i>،</i>	Area), sydne	y West also con	nprises Greate	er Lithgow LGA.							
GMA, Greater Murray Area MAC, M	acquarie Area	NEA	, New Englan	d Area	CCA, Centra	al Coast Area	SES, Sol	uth Eastern Syd	iney Area	WEN, Wentwo	rth Area	SA, Southern Area	Area	NA, Mid West	MWA, Mid Western Area		C, North Co	MNC, North Coast Area.	
NSA, Northern Sydney Area CSA, Ce	ntral sydney A	rea WSH	A, Western Sy	aney Area	FWA, Far W	est Area	HUN, HU	unter Area		NKA, NORTHERI	N KIVERS Area	ILL, IIIawarra	Area	vs, south Wes	tern syaney		Justice Hea	ITT SERVICE.	

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